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
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FERNANDO DE SZYSZLO

MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION IN CHILE AND PERU

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FERNANDO DE SZYSZLO

MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION IN CHILE AND PERU

BY

DOUGLAS VINCENT KOTTAL, B.A.

REPORTS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
MASTER OF ARTS



THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

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FERNANDO DE SZYSZLO

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## FERNANDO DE SZYSZLO

Fernando de Szyszlo Valdelomar has been called "the first painter" in Peru to "operate in the authentic vanguard" of modern painting.<sup>1</sup> His unique interpretation of the reality of Peru helped free Peruvian art from the dying thesis of Indigenism at the same time it was acting - along with other Latin Americans' interpretations of their realities<sup>2</sup> - to break what Szyszlo himself called the "servile imitation of European academicism"<sup>3</sup> of the early Twentieth Century. With the arrival of Szyszlo, modern, abstract art in Peru also arrived.

Although Szyszlo met with some initial problems in his propounding of abstract art, his final reception was assured by three things. The first was a growing sense of nationalism in his native country; the second, the reaction among his generation of artists to Indigenism. The third was a continuing exposure of Peruvians to modern art, which heightened their understanding and appreciation of it.

The spirit of nationalism in Peru had been through several cycles in the previous sixty years. The catastrophic defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) started a period of deep soul-searching among the intelligentsia of Peru. Many of them saw the primary reason



for their country's defeat, and continuing weakness, in the separation of their country. The coastal elite was isolated, politically, socially, and even economically, from the masses of idigenes in the highlands.

The often-repeated story of the highlanders who thought that the recent war had been a struggle between two obscure caudillos - a General Peru and a General Chile - was a bittersweet illustration of the lack of national integration.<sup>4</sup>

Manuel González Prada (1848-1918) first began to stir the pot of Peruvian nationalism. Prada attacked all sectors of Peruvian society except the Indians, calling for reforms to "forge a strong and unified nation."<sup>5</sup> Although his ideas were not well-received in his time, they set an example which strongly influenced the intellectuals and political leaders who emerged after World War I.

Foremost among these was Jose Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930). Beginning in the 1920s, Mariátegui established himself as the greatest Peruvian thinker of his time. His book Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality had a tremendous effect on Peru. Combining his own ideas with those of González Prada and others, he arrived at a truly consistent analysis of Peruvian society. For him, the socialist evolution of society would not only return Peru to the values of her Inca past, but would also endow her with the capabilities of modern science. His vision of Peru helped give rise to a strong nationalistic spirit in the 1930s.<sup>6</sup>

World War II and its aftermath brought the uneasiness of the Cold War. It also brought another cycle of nationalism. Beginning in the 1950s, many leading Peruvian intellectuals and political leaders began to reject external influence (especially that of the United States). The vision of Peru's reality again began to rise. In 1962, a reformist military junta implemented many programs which were aimed at joining the two Perus, the coast and the highlands, and Fernando Belaúnde Terry's 1963-1968 government would attempt even more nationalistic reforms along the same lines.<sup>7</sup>

This continual rising cycle of nationalism made Peruvians more aware of their potentiality as a nation. It especially served as one of the foundations in understanding who they were, and what the Peruvian reality was.

Important as this developing sense of nation was, in art it was perhaps overshadowed by another demonstration of nationalism: Indigenism. The nationalist rebound in Italy, France, and Spain during the 1920s; the inherent nationalism of the Mexican muralist movement of 1922; the continuing national interest in regaining Tacna and Arica Provinces (lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific); and the importation of the ideals of the 1917 Russian Revolution, along with Mariátegui's clear statement of Peruvian life, spurred the nationalism of the 1930s. It also led to the formation of the new artistic school of Indigenism in Peru by José Sabogal (1888-1956).

Under Sabogal, Indigenism was the rejection of academicism, and the new artistic movements identified with European decadence. Indigenism was the dignification of Peruvian reality: ethnic, geographic, social. It was the assertion, the confirmation, of Peru's reality versus that forced upon it by external forces, and saw the ascendancy of the Indian as a testimony of Americanism and Peruvianism.

Unfortunately, in the end, Indigenism proved to be propelled by forces too weak to keep it alive. Although it had an initial tremendous impact, it lacked a true motive, a true intent. Sabogal himself lacked enough of a strong formal academic background to overcome the lack of aesthetic expression; his attempted use of the Mexican model was one which couldn't be transferred and resulted in sentimentality instead of a dynamic ideology able to survive on its own. The movement became rigid and dogmatic, and became mere representation, not expression. By 1940 it had lost its strength, even though Sabogal had become director of the National School of Fine Arts (where he remained until 1943).<sup>8</sup> Szyszlo said this of Indigenism:

. . . that which in Orozco was a fierce and uncontrolled statement, in the best tradition of Goyaesque expressionism, and what was in Rivera an uneven, but always skillful union of the fresco style of early Italian Renaissance with a certain reference to Gauguin, rapidly became in its disciples throughout the rest of America a torpid exploitation of native subject matter which necessarily had to lead to a picturesque art in which the exoticism of the

subject was the only - and very doubtful - contribution.<sup>9</sup>

As an epitaph, it may be strongly worded, but it reveals the major flaw of Indigenism. The major strength of the brief trajectory of the movement, however, was that it, too, revealed more to Peruvians about who they were. Even if it were a shallow interpretation, it served its moment in perhaps helping to free Peruvian artists from their European bonds, and opening them up to the transition from Indigenism to modernism.

Szyszló also cites the fact that World War II forced many Latin American artists to return to Latin America, where their participation in gallery and museum exhibitions contributed to a raising of the art-consciousness throughout the region.<sup>10</sup>

This, then, was the scene into which Szyszló entered: a country which was more aware of itself culturally, and perhaps what it could be. He reinforced both of those awarenesses.

Szyszló was born in Lima in 1925. As a youth, he attended the Jesuit School La Inmaculada in Lima, and decided to choose architecture as his profession. His first year of study at the School of Engineers (1943) revealed to him "the badness that was in that graphic discipline."<sup>11</sup> As a result, he began to attend night classes in art at the

School of Plastic Arts of the Catholic University in 1944, and immediately saw that that was where his interests were.

. . . I had arrived at an interest in painting . . . through lectures about the drama of Impressionist painting. Many lectures about Ganguin, about Van Gogh . . . then an interest in painting as a valid destiny really awakened in me, with those heroic connotations which I gave to the case of Gauguin, or the case of Van Gogh.<sup>12</sup>

His decision to throw away the highly respected career of an architect for that of a painter caused his family much anxiety, but had little effect on his decision.

The School of Plastic Arts was, at that time, under the guidance of the Viennese Expressionist Adolph Winternitz. Under his direction, the students did "very few academic exercises." What was taught was "an artistic conduct: how to live as an artist, what it is to be an artist, what is important to an artist." The essence of the instruction was "the atmosphere of creation, the state in which an artist should be or should have to really get something out of himself." Art was something "born of necessity, and it was better to do nothing if it did not surge from an authentic compulsion," and creation was what was important, not necessarily the method or technique.<sup>13</sup>

Szyszlo was one of the first artists to enter the Catholic University. In fact, he was an exception, as the vast majority of students attended the National School of Fine Arts.

He probably attended the Catholic University for two reasons. First, the University's School of Plastic Arts - under Winternitz - had a reputation as a center of a high quality of art instruction. Second, Szyszlo had already identified himself as one of the generation who were dissatisfied with academicism, Indigenism, and the sense of provinciality which were seen as major flaws in the National School at the time (Sabogal had left the year before.) Szyszlo's identification with the rising currents in art was so strong, that in 1943 he had joined the Agrupación Espacio (Space Group), which promoted and defended modern art. Szyszlo was its visual standard-bearer, and its members included some of Peru's best writers and critics: José María Arguedas, Sebastian Salazar Bondy, Javier Solorugen. These meetings and discussions provided further impetus for his interest in literature - especially poetry - and art.<sup>14</sup>

Szyszlo finished his studies at the Catholic University in 1946.<sup>15</sup> In Lima, in 1947, he had his first one-man show. At that time, his works were still figurative, and show a variety of definite influences. Interior (1948, Fig. 1), is a melange of Cubism, Surrealism, and the influence of Paul Klee (Swiss, 1879-1940). Cubist influence, especially Picasso, shows most clearly in the substitution of a vague, shallow, ambiguous sense of space for what is a three-dimensional picture: perspective has been sacrificed, and seems to operate only on one flat plane.



The eerie, dreamlike quality, especially that of the semi-transparent child(?), comes from Surrealism, and reflects a continuing, lifelong interest. In Indagación, he mentions a "natural inclination" toward it--that it was the common denominator of the meetings of his circle of friends.<sup>16</sup> In 1955, he called Surrealism "one of the most honest and respectable" of art movements; it was "a complete movement because it embraced all the branches of art."<sup>17</sup> His constant references to the unconscious evoking an image, and the uniting of imagination and dream relate directly to Surrealism's idea of the unconscious as the fount of the imagination, in an exploration of personal conscious and unconscious dreams and fantasies.<sup>18</sup>

His Surrealism is not that of a Dalí or Tanguy: it is not naturalistic Surrealism. Rather, it is the Surrealism of a Miró, an organic or absolute Surrealism. Where naturalistic Surrealism

. . . presents, in meticulous detail, recognizable scenes and objects which are taken out of natural context, distorted and combined in fantastic ways as they might be in dreams. . .<sup>19</sup>

organic Surrealism reflects dictation of thought without control of the mind. The result is "generally close to abstraction, although some degree of imagery is normally present."<sup>20</sup> As Szyslo's work developed, his shapes indeed began to attain what Janson calls "biomorphic concretion" in

their "vigorous life."<sup>21</sup>

Klee's influence in Interior is apparent in the quality of childlike naiveté, which was one of Klee's hallmarks. Perhaps even more important than the visually apparent influence, however, was Klee's approach.

He [Klee] sought to clarify the process of creation as an intuitive act arising from the peculiar spirit of the artist but affected all by his experiences, remembered consciously or not, including the images, materials, and forms with which he had worked.<sup>22</sup>

This concentration on the process and atmosphere of creation paralleled the artistic conduct Szyszlo learned at the Catholic University, and became more important to his own personal style.

Another influence on his work at this time was Rufino Tamayo (Mexican, b. 1899). Gesualdo speaks of "Tamayesque works"<sup>23</sup> in the 1947 exhibition. From other references - including Szyszlo's - one must assume that it is more color than anything else to which Gesualdo refers, as Szyszlo's colors at this time were more flat and somber. Westphalen, however, points out that this connection is oftentimes not complete insofar as Tamayo's color changed according to which period he was in.<sup>24</sup> To Westphalen, the link is more one of a "Romantic exploitation of color, its utilization to express states of mind [or spirit]."<sup>25</sup> Tamayo also became more important to Szyszlo in the next years.

This was not only because he helped to free Szyszlo from the influence of Cubism, but also because Szyszlo saw him as using art of all ages to establish a means of expression which was profoundly his own, international, and national, all at the same time.<sup>26</sup> As will be seen later, this mixture came to be of utmost importance to Szyszlo in his own work.

Szyszlo's work during this period reflects diffuse influences. Not only is that because he was still being exposed more each day to art itself, but it was probably also due to the state of flux in the world of art, as it transitioned to abstract art. Although fantasy painting in all its forms still abounded, Abstract Expressionism was developing in the United States, and Tachisme (from tache: blob) was developing (or had developed) in France. These new currents, and others, developing in different countries at the same time, offered myriad routes to unique plastic means of expression. At the same time, many Latin American artists were beginning to see the need to reconcile their national peculiarities with the more international ideas to reach that means.<sup>27</sup> For all artists, but perhaps even more so for the Latin Americans, the "issues were not as clear" as for the generations before; "sides were harder to take."<sup>28</sup>

In 1949, stifled by the backwardness and provinciality of the Peruvian art scene, Szyszlo, as so many other Latin Americans before and after him, went to Europe. Initially in Paris (1949-1954); and then Florence (1954-1955),

one of his first discoveries was that he knew little about the technical aspects of painting.

When I arrived in Europe, I understood violently that I had not learned the things about painting that could be learned, that is to say, disciplines like the chemistry of painting, realistic drawing, realistic painting, all the complex technique which is in descriptive painting.<sup>29</sup>

Although he had a good background in artistic conduct, he lacked the formal technical background he needed. As one means of overcoming this, he began first to copy the Old Masters (in Paris), and later to copy the works in the Pitti Palace in Florence.

His trip to Europe was also his first exposure, in person, to the works of the great painters. Previously, he had known the Old Masters only through illustrations, and the effects of seeing them in person was profound.

Do you know what it is like for a painter who has never seen an original painting by Rembrandt, for example? It is like telling someone that Joyce is marvelous, but never letting them understand him except through summaries. I recall . . . the shock it was to see them for the first time.<sup>30</sup>

His shock was not just the sheer exposure. It also lay in the texture, and glazing - the beauty of the surface - and in chiaroscuro. Rembrandt, Titian, the masters of the Venetian Renaissance, Van Gogh, and others - all provided fresh impulses to his senses, even though it would take time for him to assimilate them, and time for them to show in his

own work.<sup>31</sup>

In Paris he also benefitted from exchanging ideas with other Latin Americans. With Octavio Paz (then Third Secretary at the Mexican Embassy) as a focal point, he met and talked with Enrique Zañartu (b. 1921) and Nemesio Antuñez (b. 1918) of Chile; Alejandro Obregón (b. 1920) of Colombia; Tamayo; Alejandro Otero (b. 1921), Jesús Soto (b. 1923), and Carlos Bogen of Venezuela. He also met Ernesto Cardenal, and Martínez Rivas (Nicaraguan poet). More importantly, he met Marta Traba and José Gomez Sicre, who were to become important champions of Latin American painting, and who were to do much - through their writing and other activities - to help abstract painting find its place in Latin America.<sup>32</sup> Although each of the artists was to establish his own style in the future, it was no coincidence that each returned with a vision of modern art.

Szyszlo's stay in Europe was critical to his development as a painter for two reasons. First, he completed the transition to abstract art; second, he discovered he was a Latin American.

When he left Peru, Szyszlo had been freed from Cubism (with Tamayo's help). He had already been drifting toward abstract painting, and his stay in Paris converted him totally. In fact, for a short time, before he found his own style, he was a vociferous champion of Parisian abstract

painting.<sup>33</sup> The main influences of this change were Hans Hartung (German, b. 1904) and Pierre Soulages (French, b. 1919).<sup>34</sup> Both Hartung and Soulages were central figures in the Tachisme school (or informal art), which rejected figurative and geometric forms for the use of totally spontaneous techniques.<sup>35</sup>

Szyszlo met Hartung in Paris. Certainly they shared common interests. Both respected Rembrandt highly; Szyszlo's discovery of the importance of drawing had been one of Hartung's loves since the early Twenties; but it was Szyszlo's growing intellectual development which must have been the strongest bond. Hartung looked at the creative act much the same way as Szyszlo did.<sup>35</sup> Hartung looked at objects in order "to transfer the emotions he felt in their presence into an inner realm of his own from which their realities could be most readily communicated."<sup>37</sup>

It was this reaching into one's self to communicate previously seen or felt things (whether consciously or unconsciously) that began to characterize Szyszlo's work; the internal translation became important in his mature style. But Hartung still believed in the moment of the gesture, while even at this point, Szyszlo's approach was more deliberate.<sup>38</sup>

Soulages probably struck a deep chord with the architectural sense of his work - the massive, physical presence which "may have been inspired originally by the



prehistoric dolmens of his native Auvergne, as it certainly was by the Romanesque sculpture of the area."<sup>39</sup> Both Soulages and Szyszlo came from countries whose past extended far back beyond Christian times. The telluric presence of pre-Christian cultures was readily observable, and both had a sense of history - Szyszlo's feeling for pre-Columbian art was particularly strong, and the pre-Columbian tradition is particularly strong in Peru. The difference is that where Soulages was drawing upon those ancient images in the 1940s and 1950s, Szyszlo would not merge them into his paintings in a sure fashion until the 1960s and 1970s.

One influence whose influence or value is hard to judge is that both Hartung and Soulages had already made their bid for artistic freedom, and had succeeded in it. They had burst the overwhelming bonds of cubism and geometric abstraction in the creation of a new form of expression.<sup>40</sup> Szyszlo was trying to break the same type of bonds from earlier movements as he moved toward finding his own type of expression. Although he had only gotten as far as painting "strictly within the canons of Parisian abstraction of the 1950s"<sup>41</sup> at this point, all the things he had seen and experienced were laying the foundation for his later independence.

Szysylo's discovery that he was a Latin American was not the simplistic idea it seems at first. For years, Latin America had followed Europe's lead where art was

concerned. Movements which began in Europe were transferred almost whole to Latin America. It was a sense of over-dependence on Europe for ideas, at the same that a need for a unique Latin American approach was felt, that led to the rise of the important internationally-recognized Latin American painters of the 1950s on.

That was Szyszlo's discovery: that he was not a European, but a Latin American, with his own unique approach to, and interpretation of, plastic expression. In his case, it meant two things. The first was how to blend the international styles, concepts, and currents with that which was uniquely Peruvian to arrive at an expression which at the same time it was modern and international, had not lost its more native, national meanings and roots. The second factor involved increasing the awareness of Peruvian society to what the first meant.

For me, the European adventure ended with the conviction that I had to live in Paris and try to create my work there, to contribute in whatever way to how things changed. I, like man, arrived at the conviction that . . . it was necessary for all of us to return and change the circumstances.<sup>42</sup>

By the time he left Europe in 1955, Szyszlo had received his formal academic background in modernism. His background in things unique to his country was less formal, but certainly not shallower, and that background centered around pre-Columbian art.

Szyszlo's interest in pre-Columbian art went back to before he left Peru. While still there, he had been interested in Chavín (circa 1200 B.C.-200 A.D.), Mochica (circa 100 B.C.-800 A.D.), Nazca (circa 250 A.D.-850 A.D.), Chancay (circa 1300-1500 A.D.), and Inca (circa 1250-1550 A.D.) art. He had already begun what was to be a lifelong study of the ceramics, archaeological ruins, textiles, legends, and history of the ancient Peruvians.<sup>43</sup> "He found in pre-Columbian art a kind of abstraction - autonomous, powerful - that appealed to him both spiritually and technically."<sup>44</sup>

The interest in the abstract in pre-Columbian art had already been shown in a series of works he did which were influenced by the painted tapestries of the Chancay culture. Through them he began to approach abstract painting, using them as a step in much the same way he did the influence of Klee, Hartung, and the rest.

Just as pre-Columbian art interested him by its autonomy and abstraction, it also interested him in the sense that he felt the art of one's own national past deserved as careful study and attention as did that of the Old Masters.<sup>45</sup> "A country in which its tradition, its myths, its history, don't form a part of its lifeblood is destined to be absorbed spiritually and materially by others."<sup>46</sup> And his vision of Peruvian art as being absorbed by European or North American influences until it was only a pale reflection of Europe or North America drove him to find the "resistance"

about which Marta Traba speaks - the resistance to domination by external forces.<sup>47</sup>

Szyszlo's problem in the 1950s lay in how to unite these concepts, but his first efforts only proved the need to change the circumstances, and that he needed to further define his work. While in Europe, he had continued to exhibit. Neither in Paris in 1950, nor in Florence in 1955 (he sold one painting in each show) did he apparently receive overwhelming reviews.<sup>48</sup>

Composición (1954, Fig. 2) may be typical of his work of the period. It is obvious that he has departed from the figurative, although the hint of the face/head in the center points, perhaps, to where he would one day arrive. His colors still show Tamayesque influences: they are the same earth tones. The overall image, however, shows his striving toward his goal: one has the sense of the presence of a mystical being hovering over (or in front of) a mountainous (Peruvian?) landscape. Although it may be considered an approach to how to mold modernism with evocations from his national past, the work shows that it is not a final expression of a concept. It is as if it were a state proof in printmaking: the final result may be vaguely visible, but Composición is only a stage in reaching that result.

While works of this type were accepted in Europe--which had seen far more abstract ones already--in Peru the reception was different. Still somewhat isolated from the

latest developments in modern art, the country was not yet either well-enough exposed to them nor was it experiencing another nationalistic upswing. Thus, a one-man show Szyszlo had in Lima in 1951 was received with hostility. "Decadent, immoral, unPeruvian,"<sup>49</sup> were the comments, which only reinforced Szyszlo's will. Undeterred, he returned to Peru in 1955 to join battle - visually and vocally - in the defense of modern art, and to be a Peruvian painter.<sup>50</sup>

Between 1955 and 1963 he continued to exhibit regularly, not only in Latin America, but in the United States and Europe (see Appendix A for a list of exhibitions). These exposed his work more to the public and the critics, and enhanced his image as a developing artist. In 1957, he was made Professor of Painting at the Catholic University (a post he held until 1976); although the public still had doubts about his work, his peers were acknowledging him.

He also continued to travel, and thus continued his exposure to current trends in art. He had already visited New York City for a short time in 1953, where he met the critic, Dore Ashton, and the painters Franz Kline (1910-1962) and Jack Tworkov (b. 1900). In 1958, he accepted a job offer from his old friend Gomez Sicre, as an assistant/advisor in the Visual Arts Division of the Pan American Union, in Washington, D.C.<sup>51</sup>

Even more important than his appointments or travels, however, is the fact that the period 1955-1963 saw

him drawing together everything he had learned, and everything he felt, in clearer definition. Although there had been clear indications of specific influences in some of his earlier work, up to that period he had still not arrived at the means of plastically expressing himself as he wanted. Where before he had been so overwhelmed that he sometimes was almost outright parroting other movements or personal influences, he now began to consciously blend them together to fit his needs. Inclination and training (especially under Winternitz) had left him intellectually aware and self-critical. Now, that, together with maturity, gave him the ability to choose what he wanted from everything he knew; that same self-awareness and maturity also gave him the increasing ability to express his goals visually.

From the Old Masters he brought three things. The first, from Rembrandt, Van Gogh, Titian, and others was texture. He felt that modern painting had done itself a disservice by not using the contrast of textures to enrich the surface, and his paintings became rich in varied texture. The connection between almost any of his works from the late 1950s on and such works as Van Gogh's Starry Night (1889) or Wheat Field and Cypress Trees (1889) is forceful and immediate. Glazing (the second point) had been a technique used during the Renaissance (and after) to enrich the beauty of the surface, and Szyszlo added it to texturing both for its own intrinsic luminosity and to enhance the texture itself.



Chiaroscuro is the third lesson well-learned from the Masters, especially Rembrandt.

There are two great lines in painting: the colorists, and those of chiaroscuro. That is to say that which comes from Rembrandt and that which comes from, let us say, Breughel to Miro, who don't have, these last, plays of light and shadow, but rather plays of color. Technically, I always proceed from tone. . .<sup>52</sup>

Certainly the same play of light and shade used to such effect by Rembrandt in The Company of Captain Frans Banning Cocq ("The Night Watch," 1642) and The Blinding of Samsom (1636) is prominent in Szyszlo. There is also a similarity in many of his paintings to Rembrandt's rich but subdued tones and colors (besides Tamayo's). The sense and importance of tone is reinforced when one understands that Szyszlo's ideas for a painting are always done in black and white.

His ties to Surrealism remained strong, especially in the unconscious, the use of threatening forms, and the juxtapositions of disparate forms. He begins his paintings without a theme, but he does have certain images from which he proceeds in order to evoke a mysterious climate, mood, atmosphere, or the like. His is not pure Surrealism, where dreams are directly transferred to the canvas. "What I have before and during the process of painting is a knowledge of the element as sensation, as expression of movement, not as a verbalizeable plan for executing it."<sup>54</sup> He does follow the Surrealist idea of chance producing the work:

I start with mixed [confusas] notions which I later attempt to resolve plastically, giving them an equivalent form, until something which is not deliberated is produced.<sup>55</sup>

One result of this is often a certain tension between his forms and colors. His forms especially are often threatening either through their specific shapes, or through the juxtaposition of dissimilar shapes (and tension, threatening forms, or the juxtaposition of dissimilar forms are all Surrealistic characteristics).<sup>56</sup> In the final result, however, as with Arp, it is the choice of chance, and not chance alone that he follows.

The technique he uses to transfer his ideas relies strictly on choice, as it is a very deliberate process. The unprecise notions are first refined to a precise black-and-white drawing on the canvas itself. This drawing is then covered with a thick layer of white in which the textures he wants are reproduced. After the texturing, he covers the canvas with a strong base color, which is covered in turn with a glaze (or glazes). The final painting is thus one or more colors over a strong background one.<sup>57</sup> In his later works, especially, where his colors are richer, the glazes produce a superb luminosity.

His major problem still lay in how to use these influences and techniques to establish a language which spoke for both the international and the local; a language which was international without losing the sense of being Peruvian.

To do that he integrated cultural and literary references in a unique style which focussed on "the difficult, turbulent but possible encounter between two worlds, two histories, two cultures, two times, two vital attitudes in the fecund unity of art."<sup>58</sup> He connected modern abstract painting to the pre-Columbian in a manner which is essentially abstract at the same time it contained allusions to pre-Columbian iconography, in the "creation of an image of the integration of the universe of the dominated cultures to Peruvian society."<sup>59</sup> He produced allusions to pre-Columbian and modern Peruvian themes, whether they were nature, landscapes, animal, or human, in a mixture of elements and parts which combined to evoke an image. The image is never clear, but it establishes a mysterious presence which immediately unites the ancient with the modern, and the national with the international. The image thus becomes "a breath of the strange dimension which unites the past and the present in terms of lines, forms, and colors,"<sup>60</sup> where he "awakens the . . . intrinsic in [the Peruvian] identity."<sup>61</sup>

From the quotations above, it is obvious that an essential part of his painting rested (and rests) in his ability to transmit and evoke an emotion or mood. This was especially important in his works of this period, where the figurative allusions are less strong than they are later. It is one of the major points which separates his work from the North Americans or Europeans of the period. Traba

especially recognizes this vital fact when she speaks of "the attitude of representing emotion, not of intellectualizing it like the Europeans."<sup>62</sup>

This emotional appeal works not only on the level of recalling the faraway spirit of the Inca Empire, and the "obsessive nature of the relations between Spaniard and Indian, between dominator and dominated in the Peruvian cultural process,"<sup>63</sup> but also through the technical aspect of recalling the technique of the textiles and painted fabrics of the ancient coastal cultures (especially the Chancay culture).<sup>64</sup> His attempts to transmit his own feelings were not only a matter of the unconscious: they were helped by a conscious love for "the solid, perennial, earthy quality of the adobe structures of the ancient Peruvians,"<sup>65</sup> and by his own innate sense of the mysterious, the tragic, the grandiose, and the splendid.<sup>66</sup>

The impact of his works also rested in the titles. Szyszlo carefully and deliberately chose titles for his works in order to both emote and evoke.

The paintings, I think, have names as people do. I have never wanted to give a painting a name capable of distracting from the vision, but rather one which is very precise. If a painting is not descriptive [realistic as opposed to abstract] people tend to look for "What is it;" thus I have always preferred that the name stirred up a [mental] climate, more than an idea.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, Szyszlo had

defined his ideas enough that he was producing works like the Cajamarca series (Fig. 3, 4). From the title to each visual detail, Szyszlo has refined his ideas to the point that it is obvious he is a painter of emerging status. The title itself evokes an image. Cajamarca was the scene of the slaughter of several hundred nobles and retainers of the Emperor Attahualpa by the Spaniards under Pizarro on 16 November 1532; the site where Attahualpa was held prisoner while his ransom was collected; and finally, the site of his execution by Pizarro on 29 August 1533.

The image evoked is one of violence, death, suffering, and betrayal - the continuing tension, on all levels, of the meeting of two civilizations. Each emotion is reinforced by the paintings, or perhaps more properly, the paintings reinforce - in an active, rather than passive role - each emotion. Angular and curved forces attack, defend against, surround, and overwhelm each other in a Surrealistic juxtaposition of opposites. The dark colors throw a somber mood over the works which is unaffected by the small patches of blue or yellow. The colors are Tamayesque in their earthy somberness (compare Fig. 5, Tamayo, Woman in Gray, 1959). Conflict and tension are rampant, and already the symbolism, although not as defined as in later works, is already "more evocative [emotional] than intellectual, . . . bordering on the mystical."<sup>68</sup>

He has thus begun to solve "the dual problem of how

to use pre-Hispanic cultural elements, while at the same time being able to borrow freely from contemporary arts."

Cajamarca is freely abstract and contemporary, while at the same time it recalls the pre-Hispanic, "the slave and the conquistador," in its "sharp-pointed, cutting, almost cruel forms, of gloomy intonations."<sup>69</sup>

During the 1950s Szyszlo began to get more acclaim for his work, not only from the critics but from the public. He passed from being un-Peruvian through being satirized. Surely the title of Orbegozo's interview, published in Cultura Peruana in December, 1955--"A Concrete Interview with an Abstract Artist" (emphasis added)--cannot be mere coincidence, especially as the entire tone of the article, from the interviewer's point of view, is tongue-in-cheek.<sup>70</sup> It was apparently during this period<sup>71</sup> that an event occurred which was to pass him from these earlier positions to the one which firmly established him, not just among his peers or critics but among the public, as Peru's most important modern painter.

That event was his discovery of the epic Quechua poem Apu Inca Atawallpaman. Szyszlo's knowledge of Quechua poetry resulted from his friendship with the poet Arguedas. His love of literature has already been mentioned, and he especially had a love of poetry. In fact, while in Paris he had done a portfolio of lithographs for Vallejo.<sup>72</sup>



The date of the composition of Apu Inca Atwallpaman is unknown,

. . . but it is considered an authentic expression in the tradition of Quechua lyric poetry, of the suffering, humiliation, and spiritual strength of a people whose destiny is symbolized in the tragic fate of the Inca Atahualpa.<sup>73</sup>

Its impact upon Szyszlo must have been enormous. He did a series of thirteen paintings on the poem, each of which was identified by "a line, a phrase, or an image"<sup>74</sup> from the poem. Even more importantly, it seems to have acted as a catalyst. Where Szyszlo's work up to this series can be seen as a searching for a sure expression, the series Apu Inca Attawallpaman is an arrival. His painting from this point on is more sure plastically, themes are more refined, and each series succeeds the next in decisive fashion.

The series was shown in 1963, and public, as well as critical, reaction was highly positive. The contrast between his 1951 show and the 1963 show is amazing. When asked to what he attributed the difference, Szyszlo said:

There are two connected reasons which I think explain it: on one side in the . . . years which separated them my painting had matured in the sense that its goals were more clear and its language more defined, also I had technically evolved. But more important, the atmosphere [i.e. the people] of Lima had acknowledged the persevering labor which we had been doing in the Institute of Contemporary Art in the spreading of the significance and the purposes of modern art. Through conferences, publications, . . . and exhibitions there was a campaign, year after year, in favor of the art of our century. I do not doubt



that the echo which the exposition of the series of Apu Inka had was the result, one of the results of that labor.<sup>75</sup>

The work of the Institute of Contemporary Art is indisputable, but in 1963, there were also other powerful forces at work in Peru, as it was going through another cycle of rising nationalism, and national interest in uniting the two Perus of the coast and highlands. As previously mentioned, the military government had instituted various reform programs which, in one way or another, had begun to refocus societal attention on Peru and her problems.

In 1962 and 1963, Fernando Belaúnde Terry had heightened this focus during his campaign for the Presidency (the military had announced they were a caretaker government only --Belaúnde was inaugurated 28 July 1963). Belaúnde's program lay in a revolution without bullets. It was to establish a basis for

. . . co-existence and co-operation between the coast and the sierra, between capitalism, individualism, and the westernized way of life on one hand, and socialism and Inca traditions of communal labour and landownership on the other.<sup>76</sup>

Belaúnde travelled and campaigned indefatigably throughout the country, talking about the need for expansion and growth as a nation, attempting to guide Peruvian society of all levels and sectors to make a better place for all in their country. Naturally, his program had tremendous appeal to the lower classes, but it also appealed in great part to the

burgeoning middle class, the Church, and the military, all of whom exercised special power in politics and thus, in reform.<sup>77</sup> Szyszlo's series, which restored "prestige to the great native theme"<sup>78</sup> came at precisely the time when Peruvians were experiencing a heightened interest in themselves and their country, and its past, present, and future.

Perhaps Szyszlo himself summed up not only his aesthetic position, but that of the time, when he said:

I believe that if some day we are to achieve our identity, both as painters and as a human group, this will come to pass in the degree that we commit ourselves not only to our individual and collective destiny, but also to the heritage of our past and to our present reality.<sup>79</sup>

If the series Apu Inka Atawallpaman marks the emergence of Szyszlo's mature style, it also marks the emergence of a custom which he is to follow henceforth. It is the pursuit and development of an element (or elements) which particularly appeals to him, and which he explores for the richness of its possibilities. He does this in several paintings, which then form a series in which he "systematically develops the element(s)" which he is interested in, "realizing diverse approximations of color and of form, but deliberately arising from it."<sup>80</sup> Each series develops the element(s) until he has explored it to his satisfaction, or until the suggestion of a new element has surfaced, when he embarks on a new series based on the new element(s).

Although the new elements may be a complete departure from those which have gone before, they are just as often inspired by the transformations through which an old element has gone. Additionally, he may carry a specific element through several series.

In the Cajamarca series (1959-1961) that element is the tension by "those two forms like the two carbons of a voltaic arc which are near to each other without touching." (top center, Fig. 3). The rest of the picture is there only to increase that tension. But it was not until 1963 that he began the systematic development of the elements, thus the series Apu Inka Atawallpaman sees some of the same elements as the Cajamarca series, but more refined and slightly changed.<sup>81</sup>

Both the Cajamarca and Apu Inka Atawallpaman series evoke the ancestral presence of the ancient Peruvian cultures more through a felt sense of the mysterious than through any specific images. The allusions are not as defined as they are in the later periods of Szyszlo's work. Additionally, the forms themselves are not as specific. In these two series, and in other works of their time (see Fig. 6 and 7), the edges of many of the forms blend more into the background, as opposed to the much more hard-edged, definite forms of later years. Some works of this period especially recall the scribbled forms of Hartung--the edges are broken, and the brushstrokes recall the strokes of a broad pencil

more than they do painting.

Works like Apu Kon Ticci Viracocha (1964) (Fig. 7) present similarities to a movement which had been very strong in the United States during the 1950s, and which had not lost its vigor even in 1964. That movement was Abstract Expressionism.

Abstract Expressionism had begun developing in New York City in the 1940s as a result of a desire for freedom from more traditional aesthetic values. It stressed spontaneous personal expression, and Surrealism, with its emphasis on the unconscious in the act of creation, was one of its basic roots. It included the total gamut of visual results from the action painting of Jackson Pollock (American, 1912-1956), to the essentially figurative works of Willem de Kooning (American, b. 1904).<sup>82</sup>

Szyszlo's first real exposure to Abstract Expressionism probably came during his 1953 visit to New York City, when he met Kline and Tworkov (both of whom were active in the movement at the time), among others. His full exposure seems to have come when he worked with The Pan American Union, between 1958 and 1960. It was then that he met De Kooning and Mark Rothko (American, 1903-1970).<sup>83</sup>

Szyszlo's link with Abstract Expressionism lies in the similarities between his works and those of what are called the Color Field painters, who were primarily distinguished by great areas of usually bright hue. Szyszlo

himself admits that he is "not a true Abstract Expressionist" due to the fact that figurative allusions are definitely present in his paintings,<sup>84</sup> but the similarity between works like Apu Kon Ticci Viracocha, and Color Field painters like Adolph Gottlieb's (American, 1903-1974) and Orb (1964, Fig. 8) and Rothko's White and Greens in Blue (1957, Fig. 9) is apparent.

It is immediately obvious that the techniques are totally different. Szyszlo's works are carefully, deliberately textured and glazed; Gottlieb's are a mixture between well-defined orbs in the top and the freely painted forms in the bottom; and Rothko's are large, thin washes of paint which form massive rectangle/squares with fuzzy edges, which overwhelm the background. Yet the ties between them are just as striking. They all present objects firmly placed on a background, creating an almost physical tension, and an optical ambiguousness which affects the sheer dynamics of perception.

Most importantly is the sense evoked by the paintings. Rothko and Gottlieb firmly believed "ancient myths and primitive art" revealed universal symbols of the unconscious mind. They "declared their intention to create, through myth-inspired paintings and a more fanciful imagery, a 'tragic and timeless' art."<sup>85</sup> Szyszlo takes this a step farther, to apply specific Peruvian myths to produce his own tragic and timeless art, but the mysterious, mythical

quality is apparent in all.

Szyszlo's affinity for Rothko is especially strong. "Even to this day I believe Mark Rothko is the greatest painter who has been born in this continent."<sup>86</sup> This affinity is especially based on their attitudes toward art. Szyszlo's admiration for Rembrandt, and especially his use of light, has been noted; Rothko admired Rembrandt very much, and speaks of his "palpable and spiritual light."<sup>87</sup> They both consistently worked with a figure-ground relationship, although Szyszlo's is much more clearly sensed, due to his more figurative allusions. Both search for light and luminosity, even if it is accomplished by different technical approaches. Both use restricted formats with many variants. Szyszlo may move from series to definite series where Rothko remains true to variants of the same forms, but when Szyszlo says he does not view himself as changing, only evolving, as all his paintings thus far are only a representation of one painting he has inside, it moves him much closer to Rothko's obvious visual statement of that same idea.

Both Szyszlo and Rothko see monsters and gods as a means toward expression. In fact, one cannot help but feel that Szyszlo would only agree with this remark by Rothko--"Without monsters and gods, art cannot enact our drama: art's most profound moments express this frustration"<sup>89</sup>--especially when Szyszlo says "art is the encounter of the sacred with the material."<sup>90</sup> Their art is unabashedly

poetic and emotional.<sup>91</sup> Finally, their attitude toward abstract versus representation is so parallel that it is amazing. Rothko maintained that he did not believe that there "was ever a question of being abstract or representational. It is only a matter of ending this silence and solitude, of breathing and stretching one's arms again;"<sup>92</sup> Szyszlo has not been as lyrical, but has maintained that there is no difference between figurative (i.e. representational) and abstract painting since early in his career,<sup>93</sup> in addition to maintaining that "in art, neither chaos nor rational order to me has special appeal. They look rather like the two faces of the same impossible dream."<sup>94</sup>

The overwhelming sense one has when comparing Szyszlo and Rothko is that here are two kindred souls; Szyszlo must certainly have been influenced by Rothko's views, but it is the sameness of the spirit which is most important, not the differences in plastic language.

Szyszlo would continue to use the idea of large expanses of saturated colors throughout his life (although they would not be the flat unrelieved expanses of color fields), but in the mid-sixties he began to evolve in another direction. His figurative allusions tended to become clearer (though no less mysterious), and the forms themselves became more complicated. The figure-background concept also became much more defined, until his paintings focused upon a



complex figure set against a simple background. He also continued the development of the concept of elements which appealed to him, until a series based on an element might extend to twenty-five or more individual paintings.

In the series La Ejecución de Túpac Amará (1966, Fig. 10), the element is the circle. "The entire series . . . is constructed upon a base of those circular images."<sup>95</sup> It is an interest based on ties with certain Chinese symbols, especially one called Pi. The interior of Pi represents the real world or the earth, and the surrounding part, the universe or the sky. The oblong in the center is a platform-like object, perhaps a scaffold (for capital punishment -- cadalso). Tension arises from the revolving sensation generated by the circles, which are held apart from each other by the platform, and by the contrast between earth and sky.

The name of the picture -- The Execution of Túpac Amará -- reinforces what the picture evokes. Túpac Amará was an Inca noble who led the last major rebellion against the Spanish after the Conquest of Peru. Thus, the reinforcement not only becomes the tension of the dominant over the dominated (the upper circle dominates the lower); but the platform becomes a scaffold for execution. On another level, the opposition of the two circles becomes the opposition of heaven and the underworld, with the scaffold both separating and linking them. Either interpretation presents a climate

of tragedy and death, reinforced by the colors, which are often predominately red.

By the series on Túpac Amará, Szyszlo's style had become well-enough defined that he had (in Gilbert Chase's words) "unquestionably succeeded in creating a new nativism, which had the immense advantage [over Indigenism] of being as thoroughly contemporary as it was deeply rooted in the Peruvian past."<sup>96</sup>

Traba has observed that Szyszlo's work

. . . is sustained by the great epic poetry--converted into a type of constant funeral--of the history of the Incas. His reference to the past is, logically, only emotional, of the finding of an atmosphere. A recurring somberness, an expansive and constant solicitation of pain . . . gives Szyszlo's work a weight which is true and which has a specific density because it is not elaborating upon the vacuity of contents, but rather that it is sunk in history. . . .<sup>97</sup>

The appearance of the series Puka Wamani (1968-1969) signals the advent of even more complex imagery, and images. In this series appears the image of the fang/claw which relate to the feline images and jaguar cult prominent in the Chavín culture (Fig. 11).<sup>98</sup> Here are also firmly established--as part of Szyszlo's imagery--the small dots or circles which Javier Solorugen sees as seeds, blood, or sperm which evoke the sense of transmission, procreation, and fertility.<sup>99</sup> Szyszlo, however, sees them "as teeth, as mouths . . . which later begin to soften, to dissolve, like

the decomposition of a soft material."<sup>100</sup> They bear a striking resemblance to the motif seen in Moche culture art (Fig. 12), and in later paintings will be, as they are in Figure 12, placed in the sky. The scaffold has become more solid, and bearing strange symbols on its side, takes on the resemblance of a pre-Columbian altar, with iconographic symbols.

Inkarri (1968, Fig. 13) continues the circle/altar imagery, but the altar is beginning to transform. It is becoming the totem or stele which feature prominently in later works.<sup>101</sup> Its monolithic appearance in what seems to be a cosmic landscape not only has the visual impact of pre-Columbian totems, but also seems to indicate the implacable presence of gods, perhaps in the same fashion as Soulages.

By the time Szyszlo had completed Inkarri, the comments of Thomas Messer two years earlier had been reinforced to the point that they seemed more a prophecy of future plastic statements by Szyszlo, rather than a summation of his works to that time.

What seems most important to me in Szyszlo's work is the intensive presence of content with definable visual, literacy, and formal components. The visual element comes to the fore in Szyszlo's landscape allusions, which are traceable to a particular reminiscence of the Peruvian landscape. The literary component . . . tends, in Szyszlo's case, to focus upon indigenous themes, which then strengthen the native timbre already contained in the visual allusion. Finally, the formal component . . . furnishes the channel through which visual and literary allusions can be brought to the surface.

. . . It is rare to see the unique personal and the generally valid, the indigenous motivation and the international common denominator, so intensely interlocked. . .<sup>102</sup>

The next series, Homenaje a E. Guevara (1969), has elements of Inkarrí and other series, but they are more identifiable as teeth and table/altar inspired by seeing the body of Che laid out as proof of his death, Homenaje goes far beyond just the notion of death. Presented as an image it links not only the ritual ceremonial sacrifices of the pre-Columbians to less ritual deaths of our times, but as Traba says, "does not consecrate . . . the death . . . of 'Che,' but rather its power to survive."<sup>103</sup> It provides, as does Apu Inka Atawallpaman, a sense of tragedy overpowering time to establish an atemporality.

Homenaje contains two elements which become a basic part of Szyszlo's plastic language. The first is the table/altar on top of which appears a human or pre-human form. The second is a pipe (caño) originally inspired by a pipe which was visible in the photographs of Che's body. Szyszlo feels that it becomes converted into a sexual element.<sup>104</sup> It, and the totems which began to be clearly defined in Paisaje (1969, Fig. 14, the next series), can be seen as phallic, and thus male-life imagery, in a fairly obvious fashion. Although other sexual imagery could be read into Szyszlo's work, Rudolf Arnheim probably best states the dangers of interpreting even obvious sexual imagery.

. . . Even in cases in which the interpretation does not seem purely arbitrary but is based on some evidence, we feel stopped halfway on the road to the inner sanctum of artistic meaning when someone asserts that the work is only about the desire for a mate, a longing to return to the womb, or a fear of castration. The gain obtained by the beholder from such a communication seems negligible, and one wonders why art has been deemed indispensable in every known culture and why it is supposed to offer the deepest insight into life and nature.<sup>105</sup>

The Paisaje series (1969, Fig. 14) signals the arrival of a new element. Inspired by Szyszlo's having to cross the desert to go and come from his studio, Paisaje further refines the totemic element, while maintaining the circles, but the totems have now assumed elements of life, thrown against a deserted landscape. "My forms, which before were encountered situated in front of a passive drop scene which didn't work [actively in the painting], begin to actively participate in the picture."<sup>106</sup> It is the contrast between the empty landscape in the background and the mysterious living totem in the foreground which establishes tension in the picture, along with a sense of great depth and space. Whether it is the conjured image of a condor seated on a rock surveying his realm which establishes a tie with the real and mythical birds of pre-Columbian Peru (Fig. 15), or the presentiment of the mysticism of the actual Peruvian landscape, Paisaje marks the junction of the figurative and the non-figurative which Szyszlo exploits in his next series.

Runa Macii (1970-1971, Fig. 16, 17) increases the vitality of the totem, and the tension between it and its vacant landscape. The sense of space is even greater, but remains dominated by the anthropomorphic/zoomorphic totems which have assumed a pre-Columbian monolithic life (compare Fig. 18). The colors are more somber, reinforcing a sense of desperate desolation. They are indeed My Fellow Man (Runa Macii), but they are also fearsome deities signalling death and life, presenting the endurance of myths and stone in a dismissal of time.

In the Imago series (1971, Fig. 19), Szyszlo approaches as closely to figurative as he ever gets. The totem, pipe, and altar are still present, but the totem is even more anthropomorphic: an armless totem is set screaming in an undefined space, vision blocked by a fang/knife, as if set upon an altar for sacrifice. Yet, truncated and threatened by dissolution as it is, it is not yet subordinated, not yet conquered, by its surroundings. It still bears --in the face of tragedy and death--some of the grandeur of man, who, put upon the world for only an eyeblink of cosmic time, still has the ability to survive beyond his mere physical presence--an endurance fully equal to that of a stone totem.

Up through the Imago series, Szyszlo's Surrealism had been present, but muted. Disparate forms, vague or

not-so-vague threats, irreal space--all had been used, but more to reinforce each other. With the series Interior, however, his imagery becomes blatant. Interior (1972, Fig. 20) and Gran Interior (Casa de Venus) (1972, Fig. 21, 22, 23) are a tremendous departure from what has gone before. Space is still important, but it is the surrounding space, and the forms become enclosed, set into rooms.

To accentuate this sensation of closed space I began to employ perspective in its most obvious form . . . In these paintings the stelae or totem . . . begin to disappear, or to end in forms which suggest birds. It is here where certain sensations which suggest feathers appear. . . The sensation of rock-feather fascinates me. [as in the bottom right of Fig. 21].<sup>107</sup>

Even more than these suggestions are the obvious Surrealist ties. Interior immediately brings to mind the vagina dentata so beloved of the Surrealists, the terror of which is accentuated by its apparent size. Gran Interior seems to be a combination still life/torture chamber: skulls, victims, modern-day iron maidens all blend in an unreal abstraction, fit for a modern Marquis de Sade. At the same time, it is a recapitulation of Szyszlo's elements: totems, altars, circles mix in confused array, while a figure straight from Imago is half-hidden by the huge skull of some strange beast. Tension, terror, dissimilar forms all merge to overwhelm the viewer, his unease heightened by the gloomy, gruesome colors. The sense of tension in Gran Interior is



heightened even more by the brightness of the interior of the large upright object in the center background. Suggestive of either an opening into the brighter light of a possibly more sane world, or perhaps of Hell itself, its ambiguity is the coup de grace to unease and irreality.

Both Piedra del Sol (1973) and Casa VIII (1974, Fig. 24) continue the rock-feather and table/altar element. In Piedra del Sol, the tension is not merely the contrast or tension between the hardness and durability of the rock versus the fragility of the feather; the final image is one of a liquid or gas issuing from the confines of an egglike container. Szyszlo says the idea was born "when I went to Sechin and saw the bodies of dead soldiers, where the blood oozed from their eyes like ribbons."<sup>108</sup> Marta Traba also sees the image of life, of some primordial beast issuing from its egg in the continuing balance of life and death.<sup>109</sup>

Casa VIII has, besides its altar/table element, the continuation of the jaguar theme. Here it is mixed with the bird image in a combination of stasis/movement, or perhaps death/life.

Purig Runa (1974-1976) maintains the totem element. Purig Runa, however, mixes it with a cityscape: on the left side is a definite building--windows and all--while a strange feathered totem of indefinable size confronts it on the right. Both are set in an eerie landscape reminiscent of Paisaje as if from some monstrous Surrealist dream.

Waman Wasi (1975, Fig. 25) returns to the altar, prominently combining it with the totem (and in others of the series, with Pi and the egg). The pipe is prominent. If the strange object in the foreground is accepted as a sacrificial head (linked with the altar) then death is again present.

In Casa VIII, Purig Runa, and Waman Wasi, Szyszlo continues a general drift to figures which are more internally complex. He maintains the figure-ground concept, with the figure generally solidly set in the landscape. Some of the Waman Wasi series do have an object (Pi, a totem) set in the sky above the landscape, possibly foreshadowing later works. Purig Runa especially experiments with perspective, but it is now exterior perspective, rather than the interior perspective of Interior.

The most dramatic change which they all share is color. In these series, Szyszlo abandons the muted, dark (or even earth) colors of the earlier series and uses brilliant hues with emphasis on red and yellow. Traba explains the change in this fashion:

. . . accepting once more the oscillations and fluctuations of a clearly circular aesthetic construction, Szyszlo leaves death and returns to life, within the undeath typical of the primitive mentality which encompasses, at the same time, total privation and the act of living together.<sup>110</sup>

After Purig Runa, Szyszlo seems to have continued to refine the vocabulary he had developed up to that point.

Series like Pasajeros (1978, Fig. 27) and Camino a mendieta (1977-1978, Fig. 28) maintain the totem, altar, circle, figure-ground, or perspective elements, or various combinations of them. They also shift between the more subdued coloration of his earlier works, and the especially bright hues which seem to have begun with Puriq Runa.

In 1979, with the series Noche Estrellada (Fig. 28, 29), he seems to have arrived at another stage. The totem element is still present, still firmly planted in a desolate landscape, but the sky is now more clearly defined. The stellar imagery of it and the title mutually support each other. Noche Estrellada XII (Fig. 28) presents a mysterious road which disappears into the horizon; Noche Estrellada XXVII (Fig. 29) has a reptilian altar/table in the foreground. Both have, thrusting across the sky and dominating it) a godlike being (identifiable by the U in Noche Estrellada XXVII, as the u-shape was used, in Mesoamerica at any rate, as one of the signs of a deity). The portrayal of sky-earth, with figures solidly fixed in both, was more hinted-at before; now it is clearly defined, although the size relationship remains undeterminable.

Camera Magna (1980, Fig. 30) reverts to the interior of earlier works, with its walls patterned in the Pi symbol of La ejecución de Túpac Amará, and a complex altar prominent in the foreground.

Figure 31 is a triptych mural Szyszlo did for the new

Pan-American Union Building in Washington, D.C. in 1981. Its three panels sum up, in many ways, the elements Szyszlo used since Gran Interior. The deity of Noche estrellada is here, as is the evermore complicated totem of Purig Runa and Pasajeros. The interior/exterior perspective interest continues to be apparent, while the road of Noche estrellada has been turned into a stairway which seems, eerily, to lead nowhere. Even more emphasized than before is the inability to relate space-distance and object size, particularly in the middle panel. The stairway gives a feeling of leading into the extreme distance, but a conflict arises between it and the wall behind it, which seems much closer.

El innombrable (Fig. 32) has the totemic element of the third panel of the mural, but the image is now completely an interior one. Cuarto de paso (1982, Fig. 33, 34) continues the emphasis on the interior. In Figure 34 there is the same hint of an opening into a brightly-lit other plane which was indicated in Gran interior.

Szyszlo's artistic life can be divided into three periods. The first period, from approximately 1944-1955, could be called his apprenticeship. During this period he learned artistic techniques and formulated his basic attitudes (the artistic conduct to which he refers). During this period he was exposed to the various movements which comprise the history of art, up to the most modern developments.

This exposure helped complete his formal training, giving him the background knowledge which he would later use for the development of his own means of plastic expression. During this period, his works tended to be more directly related to the movements current in Europe, rather than reflecting the fusion of the national and international which they would become.

The second period extends roughly from 1955 to the early or mid-1960s. It reflects his decision to return to Peru to change the circumstances, and may be seen as a search for, and development of, a means of plastic expression which was international without losing its Peruvianness. He achieved this by the careful selection of techniques from earlier Western art movements, which he combined with pre-Columbian themes and abstract painting to arrive at a mature style. His works during this period are more abstract, with less-defined allusions.


The third period is his mature style, which extends from the mid-1960s to the present. Now he is fully confident in what techniques he wants to use, and how he will combine the pre-Columbian with the modern. His figurative allusions are more defined, his colors are richer, his treatment of space is surer, and the fusion he had been searching for earlier has been achieved.

The series Apu Inka Atawallpaman was the first successful attempt in art in developing a language and theme

appropriate to modern Peru. What Mariategui had done through his Seven Interpretations, Szyszlo has done through his paintings. Szyszlo has achieved through plastic means that which acknowledges no barriers or limits; by combining the past and present Peruvian realities, he has captured the mystery and mysticism of a country whose civilization span over 3700 years of documented history, and has provided the fountain from which a new sense of identity can be fed.



2. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Composición. 1954.



1. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Interior. 1948.






4. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Cajamarca XII. 1961. Detail.



3. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Cajamarca IX. 1961.




6. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Illa. 1961. Detail.




5. Rufino Tamayo.  
Woman in Gray. 1959.




7. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Apu Kon Ticci Viracocha. 1964.




8. Adolph Gottlieb.  
Orb. 1964.



9. Mark Rothko  
White and Greens in Blue. 1957.




10. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
La ejecución de Tupac Amará. 1966.



11. Feline God relief.  
Chavín culture. Peru.




12. Jar painting. Moche culture. Peru.




13. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Inkarri. 1968.



14. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Paisaje VIII. 1969.




15. Textile fragment.  
Tiahuanaco culture. Bolivia.




16. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Runa Maci. 1970-1971.







17. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Runa Macii. 1970-1971.



18. Deity figure.  
Tiahuanaco culture. Bolivia.



19. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Imago. 1971.



20. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Interior. 1972.



21. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Gran Interior (Casa de Venus). 1972.




22. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Gran Interior (Casa de Venus). 1972. Detail.



23. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Gran Interior (Casa de Venus). 1972. Detail.



25. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Waman Wasi. 1975.



24. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Casa VIII. 1974.



27. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Camino a mendieta VI. 1978.



26. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Pasajeros. 1978.



29. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Noche estrellada XXVII. 1979.



28. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Noche estrellada XII. 1979.




30. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Camera Magna. 1980.






31. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Mural (Triptych) for the Pan-American Union Building. 1981.



32. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
El innombrable. 1981.



33. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Cuarto de paso. 1982.



34. Fernando de Szyszlo.  
Cuarto de paso. 1982.

## APPENDIX A - EXHIBITIONS

### Individual Exhibitions

- 1947 - Peruvian-North American Cultural Institute, Lima.
- 1948 - Gallery of Lima, Lima.
- 1949 - Gallery of Lima, Lima.
- 1950 - Mai Gallery, Paris.
- 1951 - Society of Architects, Lima.
- 1952 - Gallery of Lima, Lima.
- 1953 - Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.
- 1955 - Numero Gallery, Florence.
- 1956 - Museum of Modern Art, Rio de Janeiro.
  - South American Gallery, New York.
  - Institute of Contemporary Art, Lima.
- 1957 - Museum of Modern Art, São Paulo.
- 1959 - Antonio Souza Gallery, Mexico City.
- 1960 - Institute of Contemporary Art, Lima.
- 1961 - Bonino Gallery, Buenos Aires.
- 1962 - Institute of Contemporary Art, Lima.
  - Bonino Gallery, Rio de Janeiro.
- 1963 - White Art Museum, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
  - Marta Faz Gallery, Santiago, Chile.
- 1964 - Museum of Modern Art, Bogotá.
  - Museum of Fine Arts, Caracas.
- 1965 - Institute of Contemporary Art, Lima.

- 1966 - Arts Gallery, Quito.
- 1967 - Moncloa Gallery, Lima.  
Carlos Rodríguez Gallery, Lima.
- 1968 - House of the Americas, Havana.  
Museum of Modern Art, Buenos Aires.  
Institute of Contemporary Art, Lima.
- 1969 - Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.  
Carlos Rodríguez Gallery, Lima.
- 1970 - San Diego Gallery, Bogotá.  
Carlos Rodríguez Gallery, Lima.  
Carmen Waugh Gallery, Buenos Aires.  
National Institute of Culture, Lima.
- 1971 - Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.  
El Morro Gallery, San Juan, Puerto Rico.  
Arequipa Gallery, Arequipa.  
Museum of Art of the University of Puerto Rico.
- 1972 - San Diego Gallery, Bogotá.  
Center for Inter-American Relations, New York (retrospective).
- 1973 - Museum of Modern Art, Bogotá.  
Museum of Modern Art, Mexico City.  
Gallery of the Biennial of Coltejar, Medellín.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1974 - Forsythe Gallery, Ann Arbor, Michigan.  
Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.  
Forma Gallery, El Salvador.

- 1974 - Portobello Gallery, Caracas.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1975 - San Diego Gallery, Bogotá.  
The Tunnel Gallery, Guatemala.  
Special Hall, XIII Biennial of São Paulo.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1976 - Aelee Gallery, Madrid.  
Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.  
Adler/Castillo Gallery, Caracas.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1977 - San Diego Gallery, Bogotá.  
Gallery 9, Lima.  
Special Hall, "Current Art of Iberoamerica," Madrid.
- 1978 - Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.  
Panamanian Institute of Art, Panama.  
Forma Gallery, Miami.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1979 - San Diego Gallery, Bogotá.  
Adler/Castillo Gallery, Caracas.  
Gallery 9, Lima.
- 1980 - Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.

#### Principal Group Exhibitions

- 1951 - Mai Salon, Paris.
- 1957 - IV Biennial of São Paulo.
- 1958 - XXIX Biennial of Venice.

- 1958 - Carnegie International, Pittsburgh.
- 1959 - The U.S. Collects Pan American Art, Art Institute of Chicago.
- 1961 - "Latin America: New Departures", Institute of Contemporary Arts, Boston.
- 1963 - Guggenheim International, New York.
- 1966 - "Art of Latin America since Independence", Yale University, New Haven.  
"The Emergent Decade", Guggenheim Museum, New York.
- 1975 - "Twelve Latin American Artists", University Art Museum, Austin, Texas.
- 1977 - "Current Art of Iberoamerica", Madrid.



#### APPENDIX B - SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

- 1925        - Born in Lima, Peru.
- 1943        - Begins studies as an architect, which he shortly abandons.
- 1944-1946 - Studies painting at the Catholic University in Lima, under the direction of Adolph Winternitz.
- 1949-1954 - Studies art in Paris.
- 1954-1955 - Studies art in Florence.
- 1955        - Returns to Peru to live and paint.
- 1957        - Selected as Professor of Painting at the Catholic University, a post he holds until 1976.
- 1958-1960 - Works as an assistant/advisor in the Division of Visual Arts of the Pan American Union.
- 1962        - Visiting Professor of Painting in the Department of Art at Cornell University.
- 1966        - Visiting Lecturer in Art at Yale.
- 1977        - Visiting Professor (Tinker Professor) of Painting in the Department of Art at the University of Texas at Austin, Texas.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Vicente Gesualdo, ed., Enciclopedia del arte en América, 5 vols., (Buenos Aires: Bibliografía OMEBA, 1969), 2: 357.

<sup>2</sup>Marta Traba, Dos décadas en las artes plásticas latino americanas 1950-1970, (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1973), p. 37.

<sup>3</sup>Fernando de Szyszlo, "Contemporary Latin American Painting," College Art Journal 19 (Winter 1959-1960): p. 134.

<sup>4</sup>David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History, (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), p. 141.

<sup>5</sup>Stephen M. Gorman, "The Intellectual Foundations of Revolution in Peru: The Anti-Oligarchic Tradition," in Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, ed. by Stephen M. Gorman, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982) p. 197.

<sup>6</sup>Werlich, Peru, pp. 180-181.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 263-264, 274-279, 280-289.

<sup>8</sup>Gesualdo, Enciclopedia, 2: 350-352; Juan Manuel Ugarte Elespuru, Pintura y escultura en el Perú contemporáneo, (Lima: Ediciones de difusión del arte peruano, 1970), pp. 30-34.

<sup>9</sup>Szyszló, "Latin American Painting," pp. 136-137.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 140.

<sup>11</sup>Mirko Lauer, Szyszló: indagación y collage, (Lima: Mosca Azul, 1975), p. 15. Little information is available on Szyszló's childhood. Indagación provides the fullest view of his career as a painter. As it is full of responses by him to various questions, and thus presents the artist's own views, it has been relied upon heavily.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>14</sup>Ugarte, Pintura, pp. 82, 87; Fernando de Szyszlo, interview by Susan Yesis, University of Texas at Austin, Texas, 9 December 1977.

<sup>15</sup>He actually just stopped. In Indagación, p. 18, he says "Es así que no termine mis estudios" ("And so I did not finish my studies"), while in the Yesis interview, he says he left because the instruction was "too conservative."

<sup>16</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 18.

<sup>17</sup>Manuel Jesús Orbegozo, "Entrevista concreta a un pintor abstracto," Cultura Peruana, 90 (December 1955): pages unnumbered.

<sup>18</sup>Szyszló, Interview; Sebastian Salazar Bondy, "Fernando de Szyszló," (catalogue) (Buenos Aires: Museum of Modern Art, 1968), p. 10; H. H. Arnason, A History of Modern Art, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1968), pp. 340-341, 354-355.

<sup>19</sup>Arnason, Modern Art, p. 354.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>H. W. Janson, History of Art, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1962), p. 530.

<sup>22</sup>Arnason, Modern Art, p. 257.

<sup>23</sup>Gesualdo, Enciclopedia, 2: 356.

<sup>24</sup>Emilio Westphalen, "Poesía quechura y pintura abstracta," In Lauer, Indagación, p. 77; Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>25</sup>Westphalen, "Poesía," in Lauer, Indagación, p. 77.

<sup>26</sup>Szyszló, interview; Lauer, Indagación, p. 29.

<sup>27</sup>David Piper, "Western Art since 1789: Art since 1915," in The Random House Library of Modern Art, ed. by David Piper, 4 vols, (New York: Random House, 1981), 2: pp. 174-228; Arnason, Modern Art, pp. 487ff.

<sup>28</sup>Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>29</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 18.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>31</sup>Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.; Lauer, Indagación, pp. 85-86.

<sup>33</sup>Ugarte, Pintura, p. 91.

<sup>34</sup>Lauer, Indagación; Szyszlo, Interview.

<sup>35</sup>Piper, "Western Art," 4:91.

<sup>36</sup>Szyszlo, Interview; Umbro Apollonio, Hans Hartung, trans. by John Shepley, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1966), pages unnumbered.

<sup>37</sup>Apollonio, Hartung, pages unnumbered.

<sup>38</sup>The author had no examples of Szyszlo's work of the period 1949-1953, when Hartung's influence was apparently strongest. Thus, no visual comparisons have been made.

<sup>39</sup>Arnason, Modern Art, p. 543.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 542.

<sup>41</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 88.

<sup>42</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 79.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 22-25.

<sup>44</sup>Gilbert Chase, Contemporary Art in Latin America, (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 106.

<sup>45</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 25; Szyszlo, interview.

<sup>46</sup>Juan Villacorte Paredes, Pintores peruanos de la república, (Lima: Libreria Studium, 1975), p. 107.

<sup>47</sup>Traba, Dos décadas, Chap. 3, "The Resistance." This chapter deals with how the generation of artists emerging in Latin America after 1950 sought, and found, their own course in modern art, a course which was neither totally dominated by external or internal forces, but one which drew from both to form a language which equally represented the national and the international (in terms of style, subject, theme, etc.).

<sup>48</sup>Szyszlo, interview.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.; Lauer, Indagación, p. 79.

<sup>51</sup>Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>52</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 55.

<sup>53</sup>Szyszló, Interview. "The Night Watch" has been cleaned since Szyszló first saw it. Although the chiaroscuro is just as evident, the cleaning has revealed that the original colors were quite brilliant. I cannot help but wonder what other effect, if any, these works might have had if they had all been restored to their original colors.

<sup>54</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 54.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid.

<sup>56</sup>Uwe M. Schneede, Surrealism, trans. by Maria Pelikan, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1973), pp. 19-21.

<sup>57</sup>Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>58</sup>Mario Vargas Llosa, "La pintura de Fernando de Szyszló," Plural, 55 (1976), p. 45.

<sup>59</sup>Mirko Lauer, Introducción a la pintura peruana del siglo XX, (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1976), p. 163.

<sup>60</sup>Villacorte Paredes, Pintores, p. 109.

<sup>61</sup>Juan Acha, "Szyszló in el IAC," El Comercio (Lima), 16 December, 1963, pages unnumbered.

<sup>62</sup>Marta Traba, "Una América que se llama Szyszló," El Comercio (Lima), Sunday Supplement, 26 July 1964, p. 9.

<sup>63</sup>Lauer, Introducción, p. 163.

<sup>64</sup>Jose Antonio de LaValle and Werner Lang, Arte y tesoros del Perú, pintura contemporánea, 2ª parte 1920-1966, (Lima: Banco de crédito del Perú, 1976), p. 150; Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>65</sup>Chase, Contemporary Art, p. 106.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.; Szyszló, Interview.

<sup>67</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 45.

<sup>68</sup>Jacqueline Barnitz, "The Emergent Decade Revisited: Latin American Art at the Center for Inter-American Relations," Arts Magazine, 49 (Summer 1969), p. 49.

<sup>69</sup>Lavalle and Lang, Arte y tesoros, p. 154.

<sup>70</sup>Orbegozo, "Entrevista." The tone is overwhelming, and is not particularly helped by some of Szyszlo's comments, such as "either you are a Marxist or not; these are the two conceptions of the world," whose outrageousness, one feels are quite deliberate.

<sup>71</sup>Apparently, because I have been unable to find a specific date. The appearance of his series of the same name, with a unified theme, reinforced by quotations from the poem, would argue that it was not a project he had had in mind for some time, else he would have had produced the series before.

<sup>72</sup>Szyszlo, Interview.

<sup>73</sup>Chase, Contemporary Art, p. 106.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid.

<sup>75</sup>Fernando de Szyszlo to Douglas V. Kottal, Austin, Texas, August, 1982.

<sup>76</sup>Frederick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru, (London: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1967), p. 307.

<sup>77</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 307-316; Werlich, Peru, pp. 280-386.

<sup>78</sup>Traba, Dos décadas, p. 34.

<sup>79</sup>Fernando de Szyszlo, quoted in Chase, Contemporary Art, p. 106.

<sup>80</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 49.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid. The discussion of Szyszlo's development which forms the rest of the paper is by no means a discussion of all his series. It is rather meant to be a representative example.

<sup>82</sup>Piper, Library, 4:7. The more general term Abstract Expressionism, as distinct from Action Painting, has been used, as the comparisons being made are of artists who were color field painters. It should also be noted that the "spontaneous" expression was oftentimes as spontaneous as Surrealism was the direct transferral of the unconscious to the canvas.

<sup>83</sup>Szyszlo to Kottal.

<sup>84</sup> Szyszlo, Interview.

<sup>85</sup> Milton W. Brown, et al., American Art (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1979), pp. 493-494. The general discussion which follows is also based on Brown, pp. 493-496, and Sam Hunter and John Jacobus, American Art of the 20th Century, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1973), pp. 245-246, 250-251.

<sup>86</sup> Szyszlo to Kottal.

<sup>87</sup> Diane Waldman, "Mark Rothko: The Farther Shore," in Mark Rothko, 1903-1970: A Retrospective, ed. by Diane Waldman, (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1978), p. 61.

<sup>88</sup> Waldman, "Rothko," pp. 48,60; Szyszlo, Interview.

<sup>89</sup> Mark Rothko, "The Romantics Were Prompted," Possibilities I (Winter 1947-1948): 84.

<sup>90</sup> Villacorte Paredes, Pintores, p. 107.

<sup>91</sup> Brown, et al., American Art, p. 146, for Rothko; Szyszlo's evoking emotion was discussed earlier; Acha, "Szyszlo en el IAC," discusses his restoring the "poetic" to art.

<sup>92</sup> Rothko, "Romantics," p. 84.

<sup>93</sup> Orbegozo, "Entrevista," pages unnumbered.

<sup>94</sup> Fernando de Szyszlo, quoted in Lawrence Alloway, "Latin America and International Art," Art in America, 53 (June 1965): 91.

<sup>95</sup> Lauer, Indagación, p. 49.

<sup>96</sup> Chase, Contemporary Art, p. 107.

<sup>97</sup> Marta Traba, Arte latinoamericano actual, (Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1972), p. 31.

<sup>98</sup> Ferdinand Anton, The Art of Ancient Peru, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972), p. 15.

<sup>99</sup> Javier Solorugen, "El último Szyszlo," in Lauer, Indagación, p. 37.



<sup>100</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 50. The circles had appeared in Túpac Amarú, but apparently were not of major interest until Puka Wamani.

<sup>101</sup>Ibid.

<sup>102</sup>Thomas M. Messer and Cornell Capa, The Emergent Decade: Latin American Painters and Painting in the 1960's, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 88.

<sup>103</sup>Traba, Arte, p. 75.

<sup>104</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 52.

<sup>105</sup>Rudolf Arnheim, "Artistic Symbols--Freudian and Otherwise," in Toward a Psychology of Art: Collected Essays, Rudolf Arnheim, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966), p. 216. This superb article, and indeed all of Part IV, from which it is taken, helps clarify the pitfalls and dilemmas which confront the incautious when attempting to interpret artistic symbols.

<sup>106</sup>Lauer, Indagación, p. 52.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., pp. 52-53. The feather image first appeared in Puka Wamani, continuing in Imago. It is linked with the bird image in Interior. The bird image itself bears a striking resemblance to the woman's head in Picasso's Seated Bathers (1930).

<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>109</sup>Marta Traba cited in Lauer, Indagación, p. 54.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

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MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION IN CHILE AND PERU

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## MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION IN CHILE AND PERU

Although both Chile and Peru had standing armies throughout the Nineteenth Century, they remained unprofessional ones until after the War in the Pacific (1878-1883). Beginning with Emil Koerner's arrival in Chile in 1885,<sup>1</sup> and Paul Clément's arrival in Peru in 1896,<sup>2</sup> the military of both countries began the long process of professionalization, which has brought them to their present levels.

This professionalization has been responsible for the formation of attitudes and ideals which have often been the underlying causes for the military's involvement (or noninvolvement) in the political, social, and even economic affairs of their countries. By tracing development of a professional military in Chile and Peru (not only the how, but the why, of professionalization), a greater insight into the reasons for their becoming involved in matters outside those of a strictly military nature may be gained. A comparison of professionalization in Chile and Peru will also identify why the military in these two countries developed differently.

Professionalization of a military force has been interpreted in many ways. For our purposes, two classic definitions of profession and professionalism may be used



to serve as a foundation for understanding professionalization of the military in Chile and Peru. Janowitz describes a profession as follows: (1) it is a group with a specific skill acquired through intensive training; (2) it has a sense of group identity; (3) it has an internal administration (which also implies the development of a set of ethics and of minimum standards of performance).<sup>3</sup> Liuewen describes professionalism (in the military, specifically) as consisting of three facets: (1) the military turning to the exercising and development of its military function (rather than, for instance, becoming involved in politics); (2) the military being subordinate to the civil will, instead of dominating it ("servants instead of masters"); (3) the role of the military becomes more limited to its legitimate duties of national defense (against external threats) and internal security.<sup>4</sup> These two definitions serve as the basis for the goals of military professionalization: the establishment of a coherent, essentially self-regulating body whose interests are devoted more to purely military affairs than to activities outside them.

Although the above may serve as a basis for the goals of professionalization, it does not necessarily serve to show how amateur soldiers become professionals. For that, Huntington's description of the professional institutions which lead to this conversion further defines the

how of professionalization. For Huntington, amateurs become professionals through these means: (1) graduation from a Military Academy as a prerequisite for becoming an officer; (2) graduation from a War Academy (or similar higher military school) serving as preparation or a prerequisite for service in higher command or staff position; (3) establishment of a regular rotation system between command and staff positions; (4) development of a standardized method of evaluating officer performance; (5) establishment of demonstrated ability and performance as the criteria for advancement or retention.

The points made by Janowitz, Lieuwen, and Huntington all serve as one basis for a discussion of how and why military professionalization occurred in Chile and Peru. Just as important, however, is the common experience shared by the officers of those armies as they strived for professionalization. This common experience added up to the set of attitudes and distinctive, persistent patterns of thought which slowly developed in the Chilean and Peruvian military, and which influenced their views of professionalization. Thus, the professionalization of the Chilean and Peruvian military was a complex sequence of events based not only on what the final goal was to be, but how the struggle to achieve that goal was influenced by the societal forces which shaped not only the military officer as an individual, but the military institution as a whole.

Military professionalization in Chile and Peru can roughly be divided into two periods. The first period (from shortly after the War of the Pacific to about World War II) can be called the European Period, as the influence of German and French missions to Chile and Peru, respectively, was the dominant factor in the early formation of the professional organization, ideas, and attitudes of the two armies. The second period (roughly World War II to 1973, in the case of Chile; and World War II to 1968, in the case of Peru) is the United States Period, as the United States replaced the European powers as the major influence. The first two sections of this discussion deal with those two periods.

The third section is a much more speculative one, attempting to tie Eric Nordlinger's theories of military involvement in politics into the specific cases of Chile and Peru.

#### EARLY PROFESSIONALIZATION--THE EUROPEAN PERIOD

##### Background

As has already been noted, the armies of Chile and Peru remained unprofessional organizations until the end of the Nineteenth Century. The collapse of Spanish authority during the Wars of Independence gave rise to a "predatory militarism and caudillismo,"<sup>6</sup> in which armies were

raised by private individuals in order to further personal aims. In being loyal to one man, and unconcerned with any ideas of national defense, these private armies were already serving in an extramilitary function abhorred by professional armies such as those developing (or developed) in Europe.

The ease with which the caudillo and his personal army gained power was aided by the fact that the new developing countries had a long tradition of strong authoritarian rule. Not only was this a tradition seated in the authoritarianism of Spanish Colonial governments, but Peru, especially, had ties back into Inca times, where final power rested in one man, whether he be the Inca, the Viceroy, or the King. Besides the fact that this had led to acceptance of authoritarian rule as a way of life, it had also insured that open politics and political life were not a tradition so there was, initially, no popular pressure to change the authoritarian system.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, Pike maintains that "Andean Americans think it natural for the state to impose its will" over the wills of the individual, and to serve as the "mobilizing force" in society. To Andean political theorists, the existence of a multitude of competing interests can only lead to anarchy.<sup>8</sup> This tradition and view has been important to the military in Chile and Peru throughout their professionalization.

During the Nineteenth Century, both countries were totally dominated by an elite social group which, through continual intermarriage and careful maintenance of the prerequisites for class entrance, governed both nations as an oligarchy. In both Chile and Peru, military and civilian leaders came from this elite class and remained more oriented toward the elite interests than to any others. This situation existed not only as a result of the Western European/Hispanic feudal tradition of military leaders being members of the upper classes (in feudal times, knights), but also specifically because the original aristocracy of Colonial Spanish America was composed largely of the conquistadores and their descendants. Thus, the military and civilian leadership of Chile and Peru remained closely related not only through class interests but also through blood ties. The interests of one group remained irrevocably those of the other.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the authoritarian tradition and oligarchic ties evident in the military in both Chile and Peru, the very societal structure of the countries formed a foundation which was to become important in later years.

In Chile, the society was homogeneous, racially, and far less divided by class structure than was Peru.

In contrast [to Peru], Chile was a wretched frontier outpost, poor in valuable metals. . . . Chile

held no attractions for the adventurer who wished to make a quick killing. . . .

The desperate day-to-day fight for survival imparted a distinctive stamp to the progenitors of the Chilean nation. . . . The "arrived" Chilean aristocrat . . . was in intimate contact with his "inquilinos," and treated them fairly well if only because they were so few. A relatively harmonious relationship came into being and, along with the increasing ethnic homogeneity that was so radically to distinguish Chile from its neighbors to the north, was gradually strengthened. . . . Chile's population was the product of a miscegenation so complete that almost no Chilean . . . could deny the presence of an Araucanian Indian somewhere in his family tree. . . . Chile's ethnic uniformity and lack of class conflict were the silver spoons with which it was born into republican life.<sup>10</sup>

In contrast, Peru was far different. Not only was her population sharply divided between mestizos and Indians, but these groups were even divided geographically, with the major part of the mestizo population living along the coast, while the major part of the Indian population lived in the inland altiplano. The class distinction was also much greater: not only did the massive Indian population form a large and disadvantaged lower class, but it was much harder to arrive in Peruvian society.<sup>11</sup>

#### Early Professionalization in Chile

Chile's victory over Peru in the War of the Pacific made it the "undisputed Pacific power of South America."<sup>12</sup> Chileans held their military in the highest regard, and Chilean officers enjoyed the highest prestige they had ever

had. At the same time, however, forward-looking leaders came to understand that their victorious forces were not necessarily professional ones. Although they had easily beaten Peru, could they as easily overcome other external threats--such as Argentina, with whom Chile still had boundary disputes?

Still wary of the prewar diplomatic crises with Argentina and the Andean powers, Chile's leaders began to cast about for advice in forming Chile's military (at that time, the most highly trained and powerful in South America) so that military threats from other powers would never be serious. Additionally, professional forces might very well be needed to defend Chile's new territorial gains.<sup>13</sup>

At this point, the German Army had perhaps the most highly professional army in the world, as they had demonstrated both in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. German organization and staff procedures had ensured rapid and dramatic victories over forces which had been thought to be among the best in the world.<sup>14</sup> What would be more natural for the victors of the War of the Pacific to turn to the victors of 1866/1870 for help in professionalizing their military? Thus, in 1885, Guillermo Matta, the Chilean ambassador to Germany, persuaded Emil Koerner, a nineteen-year veteran in the



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
FERNANDO DE SZYSZLO MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION IN  
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German army, to go to Chile to oversee the development of a professional army.

Koerner assumed his duties in 1886, and besides agreeing "to teach artillery, infantry, cartography, military history, and tactics" also served as a subdirector of the Escuela Militar.<sup>15</sup> Koerner found a victorious army, but he also found an army which lacked technical expertise and knowledge and which lacked modern weaponry.<sup>16</sup>

Faced with the challenge of creating a professional army from what was, to a graduate of the Kriegsakademie, an almost strictly amateur group, Koerner's goals quickly became clear: the new Chilean Army was to be cast in the mold of Prussia. Professionalization of the military "meant modern education, training, and organization based on Prussian models."<sup>17</sup> At the same time, it also was to provide establishment of regulated systems of promotion, salary, and retirement, and up-to-date equipment, weapons, and technological development. The end result was to be a force which could ensure Chile's integrity against external threats.<sup>18</sup>

At this point, professionalization was not seen as inherently including the development of an ideology. If anything, it reflected the Prussian view: loyalty to the state. It was not seen as necessary to ensure the continuance of the army's apolitical stance.<sup>19</sup> "The army's loyalty was traditional, its service unquestioned."<sup>20</sup>

Germany's own interests in allowing her officers to be contracted out lay not only in maintaining the balance of European power in the area, but also in actively maintaining her influence. Germany supplied 10 percent of Latin America's imports at the end of the Nineteenth Century (rising to 16 percent by 1914); she represented over 10 percent of foreign investments in Latin America.<sup>21</sup>

Another factor which influenced professionalization was that Chile had had a relatively stable political scene since 1830: rampant caudillismo had vanished, and the government controlled the military, rather than there being various private armies in existence. This relative political stability (although without too great a diminishment in authoritarianism) allowed the military to concentrate on its own sphere, without too great a concern for threats to national security and domestic order through sheer political instability.<sup>22</sup>

Koerner's ideas quickly began to have major effects in three areas: (1) internally within the military as an institution (excluding education); (2) educationally; (3) in the class structure of the officer corps.

Koerner began internal changes which would imbue the military both with professional attitudes and attributes by reorganizing the educational system of the army and by establishing a more standard promotion/retention

system than one which operated more by favoritism. He also began the development of a set of professional ideals (honor, loyalty to the state and army, guarantor of national security) to which the military would adhere, rather than an adherence to class ideals.<sup>23</sup>

On 9 September 1886, the Academia de Guerra began its life. It was to be a staff school and aided in the adoption of the general staff system. Koerner also completely overhauled the program of instruction at the Escuela Militar. Its new program was based closely on those used in European military academies and formed a more professional base for the initial education of the Chilean officer. The Escuela and Academia thus formed a two-tier program which ensured a standard, professional education would be given to Chilean officers during their careers. Additionally, the army began to educate many common Chileans, as an illiterate did not make a competent soldier in what was becoming a more highly technical army. Koerner also urged reforms in military training--specifically in improving the physical plant, teaching materials, and equipment, and in instituting basic training in all arms for officers (in order to make what is now known as the combined arms concept a reality).<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Koerner's victory in the Civil War of 1891 allowed him to be rid of opposition in the officer

class. In one year, the basic composition of the officer class was changed. At the same time, the compositional change was affected by the fact that the oligarchic ties with the civilian elite were changing. The chances of joining the army and attending the Escuela Militar appealed to many who would have been otherwise unable--by lack of class position or wealth--to obtain the excellent education the Escuela provided. As the military developed the idea of itself as a profession and became more appealing to men from the middle class, it also began to lose its romantic appeal to the sons of the aristocracy, who began to opt for more lucrative, acceptable jobs in civil life.

The nature of the officer corps began to change, also. Koerner was eventually helped by fifty other German officers. They all served in the most influential positions of the Chilean Army (Service School instructors, War Ministry, General Staff, procurement commissions, et cetera), and gradually totally penetrated the army. Chilean officers who excelled were sent on assignment to Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, and Belgium to further their training and education, and these officers then moved on to occupy most of the positions (below general officer level) in the military.<sup>15</sup>

In the years prior to World War I one could see many young Chilean officers sporting monocles, trimmed

moustaches, cropped hair, and the regulation spiked helmet. Highly trained, often well travelled, imbued with a sense of duty and self-esteem, these officers were almost all of middle class origins. To them military service was a career: ambition, duty and expertise were paramount. In their training at the Escuela and the Academia they learned etiquette and social conduct, and by Chilean standards they were a sophisticated lot.<sup>26</sup>

Sophisticated as the new breed of Chilean officers were in the social sense, they were also becoming sophisticated in another sense: ideologically.

The German Army at this time was not apolitical; rather, it was highly politicized in the sense of a profession "not immune from civilian meddling."<sup>27</sup> It also tended to be more loyal to the higher ideal of the nation/state rather than to a specific government or administration. Both of these ideas were clearly demonstrated time and again in the German Army (e.g., the Kapp Putsch, the Army versus the Empire, the Truppenamt).

Janowitz has stated that the military officer has a sense of mission rather than a view of just a job,<sup>28</sup> and in Chile, the sense of mission became more than just one oriented toward professional military thought, as the pervasive effects of German military training reached farther than just monocles, trimmed moustaches, and spiked helmets.

The basis of the development of an ideology lay in the very fact of professionalization. Professionalization required not only that officers received more technical,

scientific training to deal with the growing complexity of modern war--it also required the military to become involved in supporting industrialization and technological advance and research, in order to maintain and develop modern equipment. The view of national defense as a primary duty required that all training, material, and management techniques were equal to the most modern forces in the area.

The military also gained a sense of cohesion and solidarity that was far beyond that of the civilian sector, while the developing sense of honor and integrity led the military officer to look upon the compromises and machinations of the politician--his nominal superior--with both distrust and disgust.

In fact, the military developed as the most modern, professional, cohesive organization in society, and quickly became aware of it.<sup>29</sup> For instance, in 1924, 400 junior officers gathered at the Club Militar to show support and unity for more than fifty of their comrades who were being threatened with disciplinary action after a silent demonstration in Congress. The demonstration came about as a result of Congress's putting aside more urgent business to vote on a salary for themselves. The 400 officers represented between one-third and one-half the officer corps, and certainly a higher percentage of junior officers. As a demonstration of cohesiveness, it was rather remarkable.<sup>29</sup>



Besides the attitude inherited through the almost total influence of the German missions, Chilean officers were exposed to the writings of important European military officers, chief among who were Colmar von der Goltz and Louis Hubert Gonsalvez Lyautey. Goltz had completely rebuilt the Ottoman Empire's army; Lyautey had established his reputation in the French army as a thinker and leader primarily through his efforts in Indochina, Madagascar, and Morocco.

Goltz first gained attention through the ideas he espoused in Das Volk in Waffen, which was quickly translated into Spanish (as El pueblo en armas), and began to have an immediate effect not only in Chile, but throughout Latin America.

In Das Volk, Goltz compared military power and prestige and the nation's cultural level. To him, a strong military represented a strong culture, while military failure resulted from internal cultural decadence. He also advanced the thought that the officer class and the science of war were either incomprehensible by, or unknown to, civilians, and that the role played by the military in modernizing, leading, and defending their country led to jealousy of them by civilians.<sup>31</sup>

Although Lyautey's influence was stronger in Peru, he still exercised a considerable one in Chile. Especially



important in his writings was his article "Du Role Social de L'Officer," published first in 1891. Lyautey believed that the duties of an officer transcended his purely military functions: the officer not only had a "social obligation to give his men a civic, moral, patriotic education,"<sup>32</sup> but also that the army had an educational, civic, and moral function which went far beyond national defense. For him, the army was the institution which was best suited and most qualified to create and unify an ordered, disciplined, and patriotic society.<sup>33</sup>

These ideas struck a chord in the military: charged with national defense, and seeing themselves as the most modern and capable group in society, they began to see themselves as "the national institution, a state within the state."<sup>34</sup>

Between 1895 and World War I, the annual report of the Minister of War became more and more to be used for making policy recommendations, and articles began to appear in the official journal of the Army (Memorias del Ejercito Chilenos, or MECH), and in book form.

Ernesto Medina Franzani wrote in El problema militar de Chile that the army's role should be one of maintaining national, political, territorial, administrative, and governmental integrity, which certainly reaches far beyond just national defense, or purely military interests in national security.

Captain Alberto Munoz Figueroa, Major Anibal Riquelme, and General Manuel Moore Bravo castigated Chilean society for backwardness, and overstratification; criticized the parliamentary system and corruption in politics; and expressed the opinion that the military should be consulted on all matters pertaining to the national interest.

Tobias Barros Ortiz consolidated this growing us versus them idea in his 1920 book Vigilia de armas: Charlas sobre la vida militar destinadas a un jóven teniente, when he stated that the army was the salvation of society, and compared the soldier's holy mission and life of self-sacrifice for the greater good to that of the priest's.<sup>35</sup>

In April 1927, Charles de Gaulle presented lectures at the French Ecole Superior de Guerre that reinforced this growing criticism and dissatisfaction. During these seminars, he held up the military as an example of a capable institution while scoring politics for not being one. He also presented the view that civilians lacked discipline and that political parties were a threat to the military, the state, and society as a whole due to the compromises, deals, changes of position and indecisiveness that politics and politicians represented.<sup>36</sup>

Even German General Hans von Seeckt, who if anyone, was a professional's professional, viewed the army as serving the state and the state alone because it was the state.<sup>37</sup>

The development of an ideology of the type described, however, is not necessarily dangerous unless it has fertile ground to fall on, with climatic conditions which will allow it to grow to fruition. The fertile ground was available in the new professionalizing Chilean military; the climate was the condition of Chilean society.

Between 1891 and 1920, the tradition of a strong national executive and leadership began to wane. The parliamentary system installed after the Civil War of 1891 was not working.<sup>38</sup> Additionally, "the politics of national leadership . . . was characterized by vapidty and vacuous rhetoric."<sup>39</sup> Lack of strong leadership led to increasing political struggles and political instability, reinforcing military distrust of politics. At the same time, Chile was suffering through one economic crisis after another, labor unrest (and outright violence) was on the upswing, and the differences in living conditions between the upper and lower classes were becoming more marked, and more noticeable, every day.<sup>40</sup>

With the military's new view of itself, these crises could only add up to a view that the state was disintegrating, with the military as the only societal sector which could save it. Thus began a series of affairs which showed the military's increasing interest in, and desire to participate in, national affairs. Beginning with the

Liga Militar (organized as a lobby to elicit professional support for various military benefit programs), and passing through the conspiracy of 1919 and Arturo Alessandri's disastrous administration of 1920-1924 (when it seemed apparent that the mere installation of a new civilian government would be unable to solve the problems confronting the nation), the military became more and more involved in politics. Finally, in 1927, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo came to power.<sup>41</sup>

Ibáñez, a former military officer, instituted many of the reforms previously called for by the military ideologists. These reforms eventually did Chile much good, but while they were being carried out, the army also became deeply involved in "the politics of social, economic, and political change."<sup>42</sup>

Up to 1931, the military enjoyed some prestige with civilians for its participation in (or as the originator of) the period of reform, thus the military was not the only one who saw its participation as providing national solidarity, economic development, and social progress.<sup>43</sup> Their prestige was helped by the degree to which the Minister of War, General Bartolomé Blanche Esperjo, was able to keep the military apolitical and apart from active political participation.<sup>44</sup>

This prestige, however, was short-lived. Ibáñez was unable to satisfy enough factions to maintain power; the Great Depression arrived; and the new caudillo fell in 1931. Thereupon followed the most bizarre period in Chilean history, as the military and civilian politicians struggled for power. The military had not necessarily given up its ideology, but it became involved in a struggle for corporate survival: salaries were cut and officers were reassigned or retired, as the new civilian governments attempted to make up for Ibáñez's splurges. Stung by these assaults upon their privileged position, the military became almost hyperactive in politics, but the reviving political system (which had begun to rebuild itself since the Alessandri years) was strong enough now to assert itself. The military also began to fragment as officers began personalistic, adventuristic entries into the political world, weakening its former institutional solidarity.

Events finally reached a point where the military had essentially repudiated its own position. Instead of being associated with economic development, political regularity, and social progress, many Chileans saw it as a reason for Chile's present (1932) economic decline, political instability, and rising social discontent.<sup>45</sup> This, tied with a growing disgust within the military over its present position, led the military (in the form of General

Blanche, who had become provisional president!) to leave the Chilean political scene on 1 October 1932. Thus

the experiences of 1931 and 1932 were a bitter lesson. The lofty ideals of the military essayists between 1910 and 1930 helped lead to the army's assumption of power as "the national institution," "the school of democracy," and "the guarantor of good government," but that assumption of power led ultimately to disgrace. After 1932 Chileans blamed officers for the very things they had praised them for only a few years earlier.<sup>46</sup>

The importance of the military essayists may be seen in another way. From 1924-1933 (essentially during the army's peak participation in politics) MECH was "an intellectual desert"<sup>47</sup>: few articles dealt with extraprofessional matters in any way. Throughout the 1930s, while the army still suffered from disrepute, few articles dealt with extraprofessional matters (and this at a time when the journals of the armies of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru were full of them). It was as if there were no need to write of ideology when the army was actually trying to practice one, and then as if the military's failures drove it back into the barracks for a reconsideration of its position. At any rate, the lessons learned from practical failure (if not ideological failure) were neither quickly nor easily forgotten.

A new generation in the military did not learn ideals other than those which stated that professionalism

equalled being apolitical. The integrity, both corporate, and personal, of the military lay in obedience (both within itself, and to the civilian government), and in discipline (especially in pursuing more purely military matters). Involvement in politics destroyed both, and the Chilean Army, for its own sake, could tolerate nothing other than an apolitical stance.<sup>48</sup>

#### Early Professionalization in Peru

Where the War of the Pacific had a positive effect on the military in Chile, it had a disastrous one on the military in Peru. It was "the hardest blow which the nation could suffer and the wound which" it produced "could not be staunched except through long years of convalescence."<sup>49</sup> The damage to national pride and the loss of territory to Chile also left a country fearful of external threats--at the same time that its military was ineffectual, and at the same time it saw its recent foe beginning its professionalization under Koerner.<sup>50</sup>

In order to combat these ills and threats, Nicolas de Piérola (President of Peru at the time) in 1895 made the conscious decision to begin the professionalization of the Peruvian Army. Impressed by the French Army's reorganization after its defeat by Prussia in 1870, and by the fact



that the French Army seemed removed from politics, Piérola contracted for a French military mission, which began its work under Colonel Paul Clément, in 1896.<sup>51</sup>

Clément's problems were much the same as were Koerner's in Chile, with the addition of rebuilding the morale and esprit of the Peruvian military. His and Piérola's immediate goals were focussed on these points:

(1) to provide the military with the scientific and technical knowledge necessary to a modern army; (2) to instill professional pride by establishing a respected educational system, and security in the form of adequate salaries and other benefits; (3) to teach young officers entering the service to think in professional, not political, terms. France was only too amenable to her officers going to Chile, if for no other reason than to maintain the balance of power in the area since Germany was all too willingly helping Chile.<sup>52</sup>

Clément began by reorganizing the Escuela Militar (1898). Much as Koerner did in Chile, Clément established a standardized program of instruction whereby the students were taught the proper use of tactics and techniques relating to a modern army. In 1904 the Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG) was created. The ESG served the same function as the Academia de Guerra in Chile: it was the second level in officer education. Based in large part on the French



Ecole Superior de Guerre, the ESG prepared officers for higher command and staff functions, and its graduates formed the General Staff.<sup>53</sup>

Eighteen ninety-eight was also the beginning of a long period (continuing up through World War II) which saw the adoption of a series of laws which standardized the processes of pay, promotion, and retirement, and saw a continuous reorganization of the army into a modern, flexible entity.<sup>54</sup> Military administration was simplified; technical branches were developed; and the combined arms concept was introduced as the basis for tactical dispositions and maneuvers. The Peru-Colombia conflict of 1932-1934 revealed problems with the organization of the General Staff, and gave birth to what eventually (in 1939) became the Permanent National Defense Council, which assumed responsibility for ensuring that methodical strategic plans for national defense were instituted, free from any political changes.

This reorganization at the national planning level; a general administrative reorganization of the army itself; and acquisition of new, modern equipment such as tanks, allowed the military to achieve a quick, stunning victory during the Peru-Ecuador clash over boundary disputes in 1941. The 1941 war itself was the beginning of a new burst of overall modernization and technification.<sup>55</sup>

Villanueva calls the 1941 war the army's "psychological recovery" from the War of the Pacific; it may very well have marked its arrival at the point where the army had converted itself into "a bureaucratic organism in which it would be possible to base a career in technification and traditional virtues."<sup>56</sup>

As in Chile, in Peru the composition and nature of the officer corps began to change. The development of the Escuela Militar into what was to be one of the best educational institutions in Peru (a "great center"<sup>57</sup> of learning) offered possibilities previously denied to those without position or wealth. This, and the increasing institutionalization of the military, offered better chances for careers and advancement to the middle-class at the same time it led many of the oligarchy to look to business for careers which offered more opportunities for advancement or immediate success. By the beginning of World War I, "few members of the social and economic elite wanted military careers."<sup>58</sup>

Fifty-seven French officers eventually served in the French military missions in Peru. They also served in the most influential positions in the army (Service School Directors, high staff positions, et cetera), and their thoughts, attitudes and influences eventually penetrated the Peruvian military. The top Peruvian officers were sent

for further training to French military schools at Saint-Cyr, Saumur, Fountainebleau, and Vincennes; they attended the Ecoles de Guerre in Paris and Brussels; and they served tours of duty in France, Belgium, Italy, and the United States. As did their peers in Chile, these officers then returned to Peru to occupy the highest positions in the military, and to spread their identification (especially after France's victory in World War I) with the "virtue, sacrifices, and glorious tradition of the French Army."<sup>59</sup> The Peruvian Army eventually came to be "modelled theoretically and spiritually in the image and likeness of the French Army."<sup>60</sup>

As with the Prussianization of the Chilean Army, however, the Frenchification of the Peruvian Army led to a certain ideological development. The French Army suffered from the "highly political"<sup>61</sup> disease mentioned of the German Army earlier. It had its Dreyfus Affair; the internal conflict of the Catholic, Radicals, and Masons; and even the maneuverings of 1914-1915 (during time of war!). The French Army was also dedicated to the idea of loyalty to the state, rather than just a particular administration, and this idea led to extramilitary thinking on the part of the new professionals in Peru.

Clément himself helped to inspire this particular view from the outset. Peru at the time was literally a

divided nation in that it lacked a good infrastructure (roads, communications, et cetera) to connect the costa, altiplano, and selva. Clément saw the development of lines of communications (and, thus, infrastructure) as not merely a necessity for national defense, but as an aid in the development of national unity. Therefore, he proposed that in order for officers serving in the provinces to know the region (in case of war), they should study the history, politics, economy, and society of that region. In 1902, the General Staff began trips to, and studies of, the interior for strategic and tactical planning purposes. Efforts were also directed at accurately mapping the frontier zones.<sup>62</sup>

The Peruvian military was also exposed to the writings of eminent European military figures, chief among them Lyautey and Joseph Gallieni. Lyautey was admired not only for the views already mentioned: he (and Gallieni) were admired for their work in Indochina and Morocco. Both of these places had large indigenous populations (as did Peru), and both Lyautey and Gallieni were respected for their expertise in dealing with them, and their views on how to achieve territorial unity in that light. Gradually, the military came to see itself as nation builders in a divided and undeveloped country,<sup>63</sup> until Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla could write:

transportation, communication, education and health programs for Indian constricts, patriotism, discipline, and national economic development could all be provided by army service and supervised by the officer corps.<sup>64</sup>

There existed, however, two great differences between Peru and Chile. First, the Peruvian Army was used extensively in the development of its frontier areas, both in an administrative and literal (road-planning, defense, et cetera) sense. Second, the Peruvian military concerned itself greatly, especially during the 1930s, with socio-economic issues. Nunn's survey of the internal journals of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru reveals that while the Peruvians were openly expressing opinions on such matters as "the use of the Army as a means of integrating the Indian and the 'cholo serrano' into the mainstream of society,"<sup>65</sup> the Chileans were not. In this particular case, the lack of discussion was almost certainly due to the homogeneity of Chilean society versus the heterogeneity of Peruvian society. For the rest, it was probably due to the ideas already presented. Nunn's research shows that Peruvian military writers produced about ten times as many articles dealing with matters outside the purely military sphere, beginning in the 1930s, as did Chilean writers.<sup>66</sup>

The Peruvians, however, seemed to be less affected by this initial ideological development than were their Chilean peers. Although the military participated in golpes

(for instance, to overthrow Billingshurst in 1914 and Leguía in 1930), their actions seemed more guided by a desire for preserving the state and ensuring order than by any real feeling (or need to demonstrate) that they were the national institution or the school of democracy, and their actions as guarantors of the Constitution were well within both the letter and spirit of the law.<sup>67</sup>

Nunn cites the military's continuing untarnished (political) record and stronger civilian antimilitaristic feelings as two reasons for the Peruvian military's lack of intense participation (that is, participation comparable to the 1924-1932 period in Chile). This view is supported if Villanueva's interpretations of the extended effect of the War of the Pacific is remembered. There were also few institutional aspirations to formulate national policy, and, thus, to run the government, based upon two reasons: (1) an essential institutional weakness still inherent in the military despite its improvements which prevented it from presenting the more cohesive front seen in Chile; (2) the autonomy begun under Piérola's no tocar policy was developed enough that the military as a body (not individuals) was still separate from society and politics as a whole. Additionally, the military's involvement in defending and developing the remote regions of the frontier gave it a chance to accomplish some of the goals about

which it wrote and spoke.<sup>68</sup> This actual involvement in the praxis of their science could only have alleviated the frustration engendered by the corresponding lack of exercise their Chilean counterparts suffered.

#### Comparison of the Two Militaries to World War II

From shortly after the War of the Pacific until approximately World War II, both Chile and Peru had developed essentially professional militaries. Before continuing with how their professionalization progressed as the United States replaced Germany and France as the dominant influence, it may be useful to compare Chile's and Peru's state of professionalization according to the guidelines of Janowitz (Figure 1), Lieuwen (Figure 2), and Huntington (Figure 3).

A comparison of the three figures shows that the military in both Chile and Peru had essentially been successful in developing themselves into a profession, and in developing the institutional framework with which to turn themselves from amateurs into professionals. They were, however, far less successful in maintaining a sheer sense of professionalism, due mainly to their incursions into politics.



FIGURE 1

Janowitz's definition of profession applied to the Chilean and Peruvian Armies,  
c. 1885-1940.

Criteria	Chile	Peru
1) Is it a group with a specific skill acquired through intensive training?	Yes--educational system developed by Koerner, et al; Combat experience of veterans of War of the Pacific.	Yes--educational system developed by Clément, et al; Combat experience of veterans of War of the Pacific.
2) Does it have a sense of group identity?	Yes--feeling of being an elite part of society; autonomy; weakened, 1924-1932.	Yes--autonomy/separation from society.
3) Does it have an internal administration?	Yes--developed by Koerner's reorganization.	Yes--developed by Clément's and Piérola's reorganization; furthered in 1920s and by Benavides (1933-1939).

FIGURE 2

Lieuwen's definition of professionalism applied to the Chilean and Peruvian Armies, c. 1885-1940.

Criteria	Chile	Peru
Has the military turned to exercising and developing its military function?	Yes--professionalizing throughout period; No--active involvement in politics 1924-1932.	Yes--professionalizing throughout period; No--involvement in politics, especially 1914; 1930-1933.
Is the military subordinate to the civil will?	Yes--1885-1924; 1932 on; No--1924-1933.	Yes--involvement in politics at urging of civilian leaders in name of guarantors of constitutional defense and order; No--involvement in politics, especially 1914 and 1930-1933.
Is the role of the military limited to its legitimate duties of national defense and internal security?	No--involvement in politics 1924-1932, as the <u>national institution</u> .	No--involvement in politics, especially 1914 and 1930-1933.

FIGURE 3

Huntington's definition of professionalization as institutional development applied to Chile and Peru, c. 1885-1940.

Criteria	Chile	Peru
Graduation from a military Academy as a prerequisite for becoming an officer.	No-- <u>rare</u> promotion from ranks.	Unknown--data unavailable.
Graduation from senior service school as a prerequisite for higher command/staff assignment.	Yes--viz German General Staff System as established in Chile.	Yes--vis French General Staff System, as established in Peru.
Establishment of a regular rotation system between command and staff assignments.	Unknown at start, developing. 1930s (assumption of yes could be made as was standard practice in German Army and importance of German Army system during period).	Unknown (assumption of yes could be made as was standard practice in French Army, and importance of the French Army System during period).
Standardized officer performance evaluation.	Yes.	Yes.
Advancement/retention based on demonstrated ability and performance.	Yes, in theory.	Yes, in theory.

## PROFESSIONALIZATION AFTER WORLD WAR II--

## THE UNITED STATES PERIOD

United States Policy and Attitude

From World War II on, the United States replaced Germany and France as the major influence upon the Chilean and Peruvian armies. It was (and is) an influence which has been both good and bad, and has had, in its own way, an influence fully as great as that of the Europeans.

During the late 1930s, the United States began to develop what would be one of the cornerstones of her policy regarding Latin America: hemispheric defense. In fact, in April 1938 (more than a year before World War II began), strategic planners began to delineate what they saw as Latin America's role in the obviously unavoidable conflict with Fascism in Europe.

The goals of the policy outlined then were these:

- (1) neutralize Nazi subversion in the Western Hemisphere;
- (2) make the maximum use of (admittedly limited) Latin American military might for hemispheric defense; (3) arrange for the use of naval and air bases throughout the region; (4) buttress political stability in the region and goodwill toward the United States; (5) ensure full access for the United States to strategic resources in the region.

They were, to a large part, all later affected by various councils or agreements.<sup>69</sup>

With the end of World War II, the arrival of the Cold War led to a desire for the continuation of cooperation between the United States and Latin America, even going as far as the 1945 recommendations of the Inter-American Defense Board that the military defense of the hemisphere would best be served by standardizing equipment, organization, and training (as possible) throughout the hemisphere.

Added to the concern for defense against an external threat was the concern for the possibility of greatly heightened internal disorders, seen mainly in the light of Communist subversion. This threat to political stability and democracy (as understood by the United States) led to the development of the cornerstone of United States policy in Latin America: internal security.

As both of these postures developed from the view that the Soviet Union was the greatest danger, the policies became important to the United States not only in terms of its national defense, but also in terms of a balance of power between the two superpowers, and in terms of ideology (i.e., Democracy versus Communism), especially after Castro seized power in Cuba.<sup>70</sup>

The United States' reactions to the overall situation took a markedly different path than did the German

and French actions in the late Nineteenth Century. Koerner, Clément, and the other German and French officers who formed the foreign military missions were generally individually contracted. They thus represented more of an individual presence of corporate knowledge than a corporate presence.

The United States, on the other hand, viewed its military missions as corporate representation of the United States military. They were contracted for between governments, not as individuals approached by governments.<sup>71</sup>

United States military missions were not a new idea born because of World War II. They were originally authorized by Congress in 1925; the system was fully operational before the entry of the United States into the war. By 1941, thirteen nations were receiving missions; by the end of World War II, all nations in Latin America were receiving United States missions.<sup>72</sup> The military assistance program has gone through many changes and names since its inception, but its basic ideas remain much the same: to provide financial aid, training and technical advice.<sup>73</sup>

From the initial aim of replacing European (especially Axis) missions as the major external military actor in Latin American, four theses have become accepted as the reasons for United States interests. The first thesis is the boomerang thesis, which states that if the United States does not supply aid, the Latin Americans will be

forced to go elsewhere, and the United States will have made enemies from friends. The second thesis--the bulwark thesis--is that the United States should provide aid because the Latin American military is the United States' best defense against Communism. The hemisphere thesis sees military aid as part of the overall United States strategy for hemispheric defense, but with the emphasis on internal security instead of defense against an external threat. The fourth thesis is the developmental thesis, which stresses military aid in the civic action role.<sup>74</sup> (The last two are often combined as internal defense and development--IDAD.) These theses were to be of concern to all parties as the Chilean and Peruvian militaries became more professionalized in the post-World War II years.

Military aid from the United States was formalized in another way. Although the Chilean and Peruvian militaries had been purchasing matériel (arms, ammunition, and equipment) from overseas sources since Koerner's time,<sup>75</sup> the United States established a formal program whereby they could receive modern matériel for upgrading their units, beginning with Lend Lease during the War. The Mutual Security Act of 1951 established the policy of providing military assistance to any country whose increased ability to defend itself was considered important to the United States.



Financial aid fell into three categories: loan credits, grant aid, and foreign military sales. Grant aid was especially important in the immediate post-war years, when tremendous stockpiles of World War II equipment were given to Latin American countries, not only in order to modernize their military establishments, but also to establish U.S. influence, and to build goodwill.<sup>76</sup> By 1970, Chile and Peru had received the amounts of aid shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1  
U.S. MILITARY AID TO CHILE AND PERU,  
1950-1970<sup>77</sup>

(In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	Chile	Peru
Military assistance program deliveries/ expenditures	91.4	86.7
Excess defense articles (grant aid)	9.8	8.3
Foreign military sales	32.0	34.0
Totals	133.2	129.0

In addition to matériel, the United States arranged programs through which Latin American military personnel could receive training at United States installations (both within the U.S. itself, and at the U.S.-run School of the

Americas in Panama). This training ranged from classes especially tailored to the needs of the country(ies) involved, to routine attendance at regular courses. By 1965, more than 2,500 Chileans and 2,300 Peruvians had taken part in this training.<sup>78</sup>

Thus, United States influence--especially in terms of strategic concepts, and of modernization of equipment and training--supplanted that of the European powers from just before World War II to throughout the post-war era, as the U.S. pushed the hemispheric defense/internal security concepts (which had not been done by French or German missions).

Unfortunately, these attempts at trying to "re-orient the functional role and strategic concept"<sup>79</sup> of the military were begun to be seen as just that. The ability of the Latin American military to maintain its "privileged position by aid, arms, and advanced-level training under the aegis of the United States"<sup>80</sup> began to be interpreted in a new light.

The new interpretation arose through a combination of factors but was in part due to a growing reaction to the attitude of the United States.

In 1963, James R. Schlesinger (then Secretary of Defense of the United States) stated

in this era the "supply effect" has shrunk in importance relative to the "influence effect" in using trade strategically. In order to gain influence, once must put other nations in a position in which they have something to lose if they are uncooperative.<sup>81</sup>

In 1964, Frank K. Sloan (a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense), speaking of the United States' continuing efforts to encourage civic action, said it

generates a better understanding and community of interests between the civilian population and the military forces and encourages the military forces to devote substantial effort and resources to the building of their countries as our own forces did in this country.<sup>82</sup>

Sloan also stated the long-range objectives of the Military Assistance Program as being to promote "sound economic, political and social institutions"<sup>83</sup> through democratic processes, and spoke of one of the advantages of bringing Latin American officers to the United States as being that "where they can see and experience the benefits of democratic processes."<sup>84</sup> Even in 1971, Vice-Admiral Peet (U.S. Navy) spoke of the considerable influence derived from foreign military sales (especially in the sense of a dependence upon the United States for repair parts for equipment).<sup>85</sup>

Also in 1971, testimony before the House Committee for Foreign Affairs revealed a concern for the selling and degree of sophisticated equipment in Latin America--to the

point of attempting to make an agreement with Great Britain and France to limit the type and amounts of this type of equipment (the major concern was aircraft).<sup>86</sup>

Although all this may have been quite correct for United States national security from the United States' view, it all too often provoked a negative reaction from the Latin Americans. Remarks like those of Schlesinger and Peet showed that aid was seen as being a political tool, as well as a means of helping in modernization. The civic action program was especially offensive to Chile and Peru, who had been involved in that type of thing for decades. And remarks about experiencing the benefits of the democratic process could not have been more offensive to the Chileans, especially with their unequalled record of democracy in Latin America.<sup>87</sup> As Edwin Lieuwen stated, the all-too-apparent real aim of aid was "to improve the United States' security position by gaining the political collaboration of Latin America. . . . Its key concern is to keep the area friendly and cooperative."<sup>88</sup>

This reaction to the United States' attitude was increased as Latin American military establishments began to combine a rising sense of nationalism with the IDAD concept. This led to a joining of the concept of national security with IDAD to form the idea of national development. National development saw the improvement of social, political,

and economic conditions as the base upon which the nation's security rested. Its course was distinct from that as the United States saw it (and will be treated in the section dealing with the ideological stance of the Peruvian military, below).

National development also saw the United States as having too much influence in Latin America: Latin American countries were becoming too dependent upon the United States, which had so thoroughly penetrated the Latin American military establishments.<sup>89</sup> Dependency implied a "denaturing," a denationalizing and a mortgaging of the military as "one of the most basic national symbols," and thus, "the nation itself."<sup>90</sup> These attitudes helped give rise to the ideological development seen in Peru during this period (known as the new professionalism).

#### Further Professionalization in Chile

After its brief incursion into politics between 1924-1932, the Chilean military withdrew from the scene and concentrated on strictly professional matters.

Institutionally, this was helped by new laws which further ensured the sameness of career progression. There were no shortcuts to high rank, no ways to speed promotion through influence. Rotation of assignments between command and staff positions (if qualified), as well as rotation

between geographical area, became standard. Education became more important in staying competitive. In fact, it became a requirement for advancement to high ranks.

By the 1960s, the institutional framework had become well-fixed enough that a prospective officer could anticipate the following career pattern. First, if accepted, he would attend the Chilean Military Academy, or the Military Polytechnic Academy. Upon graduation, he would then attend a Lieutenant's course for his service arm (Infantry, Artillery, Armor, et cetera). He would then be assigned to his first post, typically in one of the outlying provinces. Then would follow additional assignments based upon his qualifications, desires, and the needs of the military. He could also expect, if qualified, to attend the War Academy for training as a General Staff Officer, or the Polytechnic school (which were highly competitive appointments). Still later, if he continued to demonstrate excellence, he might attend the Course of Higher Command at the Academy of National Defense. Throughout his career he could expect regular pay increases with higher rank, and, also with higher rank, more assignments in and around Santiago. He could also hope for assignments to the United States or Europe, to attend various military courses (although these were also highly competitive assignments).<sup>91</sup>

Modernization of equipment was helped tremendously by the grant aid Chile received in the immediate post-war years. That, and other military assistance enabled the military to modernize its forces insofar as equipment and training were concerned. This initial modernization was hurt as time passed and the equipment became obsolescent or obsolete. By the time that happened, the grant aid program had effectively ended: between 1965-1970, excess defense articles delivery to Chile was less than 700,000 U.S. dollars--at a time when a modern medium tank might cost \$300,000.<sup>92</sup> The rising technical cost of modern equipment led to a gradual technical deterioration as the military could buy fewer items for their money. The problem was heightened by a continuing reduction in the military budget from a high in 1944 of 28.9 percent of the total budget, to 9.1 percent in 1965.<sup>93</sup> This budget decline also slowed military pay increases, and with inflation, reduced many of the lower ranking military to a basic survival situation where housing, clothing, education, et cetera, were concerned. The growth of the army overall was not keeping up with the growth of the civilian population and began to be of concern among Chilean military leaders.<sup>94</sup>

Nunn cites the possible importance of the positions of Minister of Defense and Army Commander-in-Chief (CINC) in the military's maintaining a strictly professional posture.



The Ministry of Defense acts as a basic ingredient in the government. If he is a civilian, the chances are that military influence is not cohesive or strong. If he is an officer (or even a retired officer), then military influence, or the need for support of the military at any given time, is probably greater. Civilian ministers are preferred simply because they are not military officers, and thus would be less inclined to favor one Service or branch over another. Since, in Chile, they do not have internal authority over the military, the military is able to retain a measure of autonomy. They are also a buffer between the executive or other direct political influence, and the military.

The Army CINC is appointed by the president. He is the key position in the army, and represents it. The president can, through a wise choice, select an officer (he must be a senior officer, although he is normally the senior officer) with whom he can work, if the senior officer is unsatisfactory. The president has to remember, however, that his choice has to be able to maintain discipline within the army, and (until 1973) that he should be committed to civilian control.

Thus, the president could help maintain good control of, and relations with, the army (and the other services) through picking the right men for Defense and Army CINC.

From 1932 to 1973, the majority of Chilean Defense Ministers were civilians.<sup>95</sup>

Ideologically speaking, the military also remained essentially unstirred until the 1970-1973 period. As has already been mentioned, articles in MECH\* in the 1930s showed little interest in extraprofessional matters. Beginning in 1937, MECH began to deal with a wider range of international subjects, but articles dealing with Chile itself were rarely more than purely technical ones. From 1938 to 1944, its articles were very nationalistic, but not exceptionally critical of the state or society. In the first part of the Cold War, articles appeared which saw the army as having a role to play in such areas as economic and industrial development, but there were still few comments on politics or democracy. Technical articles were still the most numerous by far. In the 1950s and 1960s, some articles were published which dealt with geopolitics and economic development, but expressing no ideology. From 1932 to 1970, the military viewed itself in the most narrow sense of having its mission as national defense.<sup>96</sup>

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\*It should be remembered that articles in MECH are not just individual writers' opinions. The articles are selected by a board of editors, and often express instruction received or thoughts engendered in military schooling. The mere fact they are published indicated what has been considered worthy of further dissemination.

One train of ideological thought did exist throughout the period (which was a common one) but was not one which was actively developed by the military itself. It was more of a reactive, anti-ideology, and it was anti-Marxism. Marxism represented a threat through its very philosophy, not only to the military, but also because the military saw Marxism to be anti-nationalism. This attitude was reinforced by the United States' stand on the subject, and by Castro's rise in Cuba and Ernesto Che Guevara's activity in Bolivia. It formed a base which helped lead to the 1973 coup.<sup>97</sup>

On 11 September 1973, the military seized control of the government. What that seizure meant, and means, is still being disputed. The question which is to be answered is why a military which had not been actively involved in politics for forty-one years would do so with such a vengeance. Much of the why lies in behavioral factors upon the military, not in their professionalization, and will be treated in a later section.

#### Further Professionalization in Peru

From World War II to 1968, the development of the Peruvian military is similar in many respects to that of Chile. Its major difference is the development of a distinctive and powerful ideology, which culminated in the events of 1968.

Within the institution, the framework developed in a way remarkably similar to the Chilean institution. Promotions became more regulated; rotation of assignments became the standard; attendance at foreign schools (both military and civilian) continued. Officers even served as observers during the conflicts in Indochina and Algeria. Grant aid, along with foreign military sales helped (initially) to modernize the military, but the same problems with cost of replacement occurred when it became obsolescent or obsolete, and led to a feeling of frustration in that the military began to feel that modern high-technology warfare was literally beyond the capacity of its country (in terms of money), despite education or professionalism.

This frustration became circular, as the military began to try to make up in education what it lacked in equipment. Education, in fact, became perhaps more important than it was in Chile, as promotion grew to be directly linked to the training system: educational activity and achievement became a base of "a rationalized bureaucratic structure without parallel even in the major military powers."<sup>98</sup> What they began to lack in terms of equipment, they tried to make up in education and professionalism, especially in the technical services.<sup>99</sup>

This further emphasis served to make the military officer feel more the equal of his counterparts in the

civilian professions: he no longer felt dominated or even intimidated by them due to education, pedigree, or power, as he felt his were more than equal.<sup>100</sup>

This shift in aid from the United States from concentrating on hemispheric defense to counter-insurgency and civic action (internal security) was seen as detrimental to the military. The shift from providing conventional warfare matériel came at a time when World War II-vintage equipment was becoming obsolete. The change in emphasis also seemed to reduce the importance of the military as an institution as regarding their primary mission: external defense. Peruvian officers thus saw less chances for equipment upgrading at a time when it became sorely needed; they also perceived the counter-insurgency doctrine as making them only a special police force. Both ideas were anathema.<sup>101</sup>

At the same time this was happening, however, there were currents stirring within the military which offset a growing bitterness about the United States policy, and which Mendoza calls "integral reaction" ("reaccion integral").<sup>102</sup> From the end of World War II on, the Peruvian military developed an ideology as it turned from viewing itself in the traditional caretaker role to one of having importance in formulating national policy. Until 1950, the military had lacked any pretensions to any other than

the traditional role, due mainly to institutional weakness: there was no organization which looked upon national development as part of the military's function. But in 1950, the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) was formed, and the military's view of itself began to change.<sup>103</sup>

The CAEM was created on 14 July 1950. It owed its existence to the Escuela Superior de Guerra's (ESG) realization in the 1940s that there was a need for a center or school for strategic studies (the ESG functioned as a General Staff College). The ESG felt that no common doctrine existed for the solution of strategic problems. It also saw the need to break Peruvian dependence on foreign influences in order to formulate its own national doctrine according to Peru's peculiar political, social, economic, and geographical realities. It also reflected the military's desire to separate further the military from the political arena--the ability to formulate strategic military doctrine at the national level granted a greater degree of autonomy while it also acted as a school for statesmen within the military. This last especially reflected the military's continuing distrust in the politicians' ability to guide national development. Originally based on the United States National War College, the CAEM soon began to go its own way.<sup>104</sup>

The CAEM began as an institution concerned with national defense in the form of protection from external threats, but in 1958 it began to be increasingly concerned with what its then-Director (General Romero Pardo) called the "general well-being" (bienestar). According to General Romero "war is only a moment of crisis," while "the need for the general well-being is permanent."<sup>105</sup> More and more, the CAEM began to focus on the national potential and development of the country by means of realizing an improvement in the socioeconomic spheres. It thus began to be more concerned with internal rather than external problems. In 1957, 15 percent of class time was directed to socioeconomic problems. It was 47 percent in 1959. In 1971, the figure was still 20 percent.<sup>106</sup> This reaction was not only a further step in breaking dependency, but also a military interpretation of the nationalism which was then in a renaissance in Peru.<sup>107</sup>

In the 1960s, the CAEM began to devote more instructional time to internal security, partly in response to the shift in United States policy, but in much greater part to the experience of the Peruvian military itself.

The military had been involved in various types of civic action programs since early in the century--the frontier programs already mentioned. Iquitos and Tumbes Provinces had been, in fact, initially under military



administration. The CAEM 1958 Selva Plan proposed putting a large geographic area under military control for experience in industrial and agricultural development.

In the early 1960s, the military gained practical experience in internal security. Between 1962-1965, the army was involved in controlling rural guerilla bands as a result of agrarian rebellion. Not only did it reveal the difficulties of controlling insurgency with conventional forces, but it revealed to many officers the continuing dualism of their contry. Young officers had always been exposed to the difference between a modernizing coast and semi-feudal highlands as a result of first assignments to the provinces. The 1962-1965 campaigns, however, exposed officers en masse to such things as debt servitude (colonato) and land tenure problems. For them, social theory was no longer something seen in school: it was a practical point now coming to roost in the barracks. The plight of the indio was now something more tangible. Other disparities were seen in the urban immigrant areas in the large cities.<sup>108</sup>

The 1962-1965 counter-guerilla campaigns also helped solidify opposition to an already hated threat: radicalism (especially of the left) and Communism. The military had been fighting radical movements since earlier in the century, with their main effort directed

against Haya de la Torre and the often violent APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) Party. In fact, it was fear of the APRA gaining power that was one of the principal causes for the military coup of 1962.<sup>109</sup> The activity of the APRA (who also tried at various times, with varying amounts of success, to suborn military members), and the involvement of Communists in the guerilla bands were seen as attempts at exploiting weakness. Both of the ideologies involved, and the fact that armed violence had occurred, were assaults upon the very roots of the military as traditionalists and the controllers of the means of coercion.<sup>110</sup>

Add to these problems economic turmoil and political party in-fighting, and it is not surprising that the military's rising ideology also showed heavily in its principal journal, the Revista Militar del Peru. Stepan notes that while between 1954-1957, two percent of its articles dealt with extraprofessional matters, between 1963-1967, more than fifty percent dealt with such subjects as internal war, engineering social change, sociopolitical analysis, et cetera.<sup>111</sup>

As the military began to reinterpret the Peruvian reality in the light of its new understanding, the CAEM apparently began to realize that the military could never divorce itself from politics. In 1963, it published

a treatise which stated:

The sad and desperate truth is that in Peru, the real powers are not the Executive, the legislature, the Judicial (system), or the Electorate, but the latifundists, the exporters, the bankers, and the American (U.S.) investors.<sup>112</sup>

In 1967, General Edgardo Mercado Jarrín stated that Peru's national weakness lay in broad organizational, economic, technological, and political elements.<sup>113</sup> The CAEM was teaching the "need to enter into the field of general politics of the State"<sup>114</sup> to right Peru's wrongs.

And in 1968, the Peruvian military began the Peruvian Revolution. . . .

#### Comparison of the Two Militaries after World War II

The Chilean and Peruvian armies displayed many of the same similarities in their development after World War II as they did before the War. Their differences were also as striking.

In terms of professionalization, their paths were almost equal: the institutional framework was strengthened, as officer assignments, rotation policy, educational requirements, et cetera, were further standardized. Both countries benefitted greatly from the military assistance program immediately after World War II in terms of equipment modernization, and some training.

In terms of other influence, however, the United States was seen as less useful, especially in Peru. Although the United States was seen as the most modern, professional army, with much to teach, the United States government's use of aid to attempt to force its strategic policies upon the two countries was resented. This was especially true in Peru, whose developing military ideology and nationalism began to run counter to U.S. desires (even though, paradoxically, at a time when Peru was herself having internal security problems), and which would eventually cause Peru to seek aid from more varied suppliers (the famous case of the refusal by the United States to sell F-5 aircraft as too advanced was the precipitating cause.)<sup>115</sup> In Chile, the much narrower view of mission, lack of ideology, and lesser autonomy, seems to have been responsible for that reaction.

United States military missions were important in arranging the administrative end of military aid, but were less influential in affecting the two militaries, as they encountered the already-internalized French and German attitudes (as adapted by Chile and Peru). The already-professionalized Chilean and Peruvian officer's corps were less-readily influenced than were the once-amateur organizations that Koerner and Clément had encountered. Little reference is found regarding the spread of internal U.S.

Army ideology and attitudes, versus political involvement except at the strategic policy level, while the influence of German and French ideology earlier is clear. Primary-source research might cast more light upon the subject.

The greatest change between the two militaries is in the development of an internal ideology. Once burned by their 1924-1932 experience, the Chilean Army developed a narrow, strictly professional view until 1970-1973. It is questionable, even now, that the 1973 coup was ideological, rather than defensive. The Peruvian Army, however, definitely developed an ideology, which not only saw them as actively involved in nation-building, but also in politics, as an institution.

A comparison of the Janowitz-Lieuwen-Huntington definitions reveals much the same as the previous one did (Figures 4-6).

Again, in terms of profession and professionalization, the two are markedly alike; but, again, in terms of professionalism, the military's involvement in politics is a negative mark.

The most remarkable point about the development of the two armies during the period is that they traded positions regarding ideology. In the earlier period, the Chilean military had initially developed a definite internal ideology, while the Peruvian military had not; in the

FIGURE 4

Janowitz's definition of profession applied to the Chilean and Peruvian Armies,  
c. 1940-1968 (Peru)/1973 (Chile).

Criteria	Chile	Peru
Is it a group with a specific skill acquired through intensive training?	Yes--officer educational requirements especially important.	Yes--officer educational requirements especially important.
Does it have a sense of group identity?	Yes--1924-1932 experiences lead to further separation from society.	Yes--ideological development especially important (as nation-builders)
Does it have an internal administration?	Yes--intensified during period.	Yes--intensified during period.

FIGURE 5

Lieuwen's definition of professionalism applied to the Chilean and Peruvian Armies, c. 1940-1968 (Peru)/1973 (Chile).

Criteria	Chile	Peru
Has the military turned to exercising and developing its military function?	Yes--professionalizing throughout period.	Yes--professionalizing throughout period.  No--involvement in politics: 1948, 1962, 1968.
Is the military subordinate to the civilian will?	No--1973 coup.	No--involvement in politics of own accord 1948, 1962, 1968.
Is the role of the military limited to its legitimate duties of national defense and internal security?	No--1973 coup.	No--involvement in politics of own accord 1948, 1962, 1968.



FIGURE 6

Huntington's definition of professionalization as institutional development applied to Chile and Peru, c. 1940-1968 (Peru)/1973 (Chile).

Criteria	Chile	Peru
Graduation from a Military Academy as a prerequisite to becoming an officer.	No--continuing (rare) promotion from ranks.	No-- <u>rare</u> promotions from ranks.
Graduation from senior service school as a prerequisite for higher/command staff assignment.	Yes--an absolute necessity.	Yes--an absolute necessity.
Establishment of a regular rotation system between command and staff assignments.	Yes.	Yes.
Standardized officer performance evaluation.	Yes.	Yes.
Advancement/retention based on demonstrated ability and performance.	Yes.	Yes.

later period, the positions were reversed. The main thread of ideological thought of the military as nation-builders was remarkably the same; however, the Peruvian Army's was much more institutionalized (thanks in great part to the coalescing force of the CAEM, an educational institution which Chile lacked), and resulted in an institutional coup, rather than a more personalized one (albeit with widespread support) such as the earlier ones in Chile.

#### MILITARY ACTIVITY VERSUS PERCEIVED THREATS

Thus far, discussion about the military in Chile and Peru has focused upon professionalization: how and why the military professionalized, and some of the effects of that professionalization. That discussion is not adequate to explain fully why the military in the two countries has or has not acted the way it does (or does not). This section will explore the why of military activity,\* especially as it applied to extraprofessional activity (in this case especially, political activity) by the military. Before that, however, there are other factors which influence the military which either have not been discussed, or which need further explanation.

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\*It should be understood that this represents only an initial attempt. Far more specific data is needed before any type of definitive explanation is possible.

### Attitudinal Behavior

Such matters as economic crises, personalismo, political instability, et cetera, have long been understood as precipitating causes of coups; however, many of the precipitating causes reflect military reaction to much more deeply-felt military attitudes.<sup>116</sup> These attitudes reflect the political sociology of the military. They include

the organizational features of the military establishment, the officer's class backgrounds, their present class and status positions, their inherited memberships in religious, racial, linguistic, and ethnic segments, the education and training that turns them into professional soldiers, and the socialization patterns that engender certain attitudes toward politics and government.<sup>117</sup>

### Officer Class Backgrounds

The relationship between the officer class and the oligarchy when officers were mostly from the oligarchy has been explored previously, as has the importance of establishing the military as a profession of the middle class. The change of the officer corps to a largely middle-class group affected it in that it began to lead them to act more in line with middle-class interests.

This change functions along several lines. First, it helps to break the ties with the oligarchy and lessens

the likelihood of the military being merely the oligarchy's watchdog. Second, it also may predispose the military to a politicized lower-class wanting a greater, more active role in society, as their goals may be contrary to middle-class interests. Last, it may be precisely because the middle-class is in the objective and subjective middle that officers may tend to represent its interests. The true effect of this is difficult to determine, however, as the 1968 Peruvian and the 1973 Chilean coups did not necessarily represent middle-class interests. Added to this is the loyalty which an officer feels to the military: his view of belonging to a societal elite may predispose him to acting along military interest lines above all others (again, as in 1968 and 1973; Nunn, especially, explores this in regards to Chile in 1973). This is especially true where, as in Chile and Peru, the officer corps is largely from one societal segment (middle-class, Catholic, mestizo).<sup>118</sup>

Hansen points out that, in the Chilean Army, a perceived decline in the military's prestige and relative societal position due to its lessened desirability as a profession in terms of low salaries and slow promotions may very well have been a factor in the military's reorientation prior to 1973.<sup>119</sup>

### Organizational Features

The Chilean and Peruvian military approximate the ideal type of bureaucracy as formulated by Weber. They are characterized by standardized, achievement-based promotions, a commitment to the rationality principle for making decisions, and a strictly-ordered hierarchy (as are most military organizations). The military differs from other large bureaucracies in the strength and forcefulness of these points.

In the military, such things as personal friendship, family connections, et cetera, may be of some use in gaining specific assignments; they are of little significance in promotion. The rationality principle is enforced by a mission orientation: individual preferences, values, or concerns often have to be ignored in order to accomplish the mission, based upon the most efficient, quickest means for that accomplishment. The hierarchical structure functions as an imperative: since the end goal of the military is victory in combat, central command and control, as well as strict obedience to all orders, is absolutely essential.

The forceful commitment to this structure functions as an underlying cause in military attitudes toward civilians. Promotion through favoritism/nepotism, compromise which threatens the accomplishment of the mission, voting on decisions, disobedience, considerations of the

need to remain popular (such as to stay in political office), are all foreign to the military view, and are seen as weaknesses.<sup>120</sup>

### The Military as Professionals

Military officers are professionals in the sense of other professions: they highly value autonomy, exclusiveness, and expertise. Autonomy is of extreme concern: military functions belong to the military alone; it alone has the right to order itself internally, to set criteria for promotions, to decide what should be in training and education programs. Autonomy also means freedom from civilian interference within the military. Exclusiveness reflects the fact that the military has no rivals in their mission of alone having the right to bear arms for defense of the nation. Expertise means the military has achieved specific levels of attainment in all the administrative and tactical operations relating to its mission. Expertise is gained through standard training programs and carefully evaluated field exercises. As has been seen, infringements upon these areas generate strong feelings within the military, while respect for them lessens those feelings.<sup>121</sup>

### Political Attitudes

The military's political attitudes have a singularly important effect upon their actions. The most important of these attitudes revolve around political order, political activity, and the governing of states. The combination of them is found almost only in the officer corps.

Political order is exceptionally important. Individuals or institutions which permit or foster political disorder are seen as dangerous, and condemned. Shaped by their own forceful hierarchical relations, the military transfers their beliefs to the civilian world. Military discipline translates itself into a belief for political order, and any threat to this order becomes very significant. There is also a fear that disorder in the political world will go so far as to require the military to be involved as policemen, a role which is seen as demeaning.<sup>122</sup>

Military attitudes toward political activity are that it is seen to be overly selfserving.<sup>123</sup> Common beliefs hold that "politics is 'dissension'; or 'corrupt'; and the expression of political opinion is 'insubordination.'"<sup>124</sup> Political parties and, thus, politicians, are harbingers of political disunity. Mass participation is even more threatening as it is seen as overly emotional, selfish, and given to excesses. These negative attitudes have their bases in the importance of hierarchy and



cohesiveness. These are seen as important characteristics of the military, and thus should be just as important to civilians. Individual and group interests should be subordinated to the greater will, just as differences within society should not give way to a divided society.

The governmental process itself is also a concern. The military's essentially apolitical view of the process leads to a concept that decision-making should be done without politicking. There is no need for partisan behavior, bargaining, or compromise, as these are not only distasteful courses to follow, but are also seen as damaging to the public interest.<sup>125</sup>

The final view of democracy often equates to it being "tedious, divisory, corrupt, oligarchic, exploiting, personalistic . . . disordered, antipatriotic," et cetera.<sup>126</sup>

Rather than the officer's political attitudes being separate and thus unsupportive of each other . . . [they] form a mutually reinforcing pattern. Each of the three attitudes implies, and thereby strengthens the other two. For example, the strong preference for an apolitical government helps induce a negative attitude toward political activity, since the latter invariably allows partisanship competition, and conflict to affect governmental decisions. Similarly, the pronounced sensitivity of political activity which frequently results in disorderly politics.<sup>127</sup>

The points just outlined reflect sociological attitudes of the military. They reflect the bases from which the military is predisposed to act in certain ways.

They do not necessarily reflect the military's acting to accomplish certain goals, which is essentially the next step in the why of extraprofessional activities. In other words, motivations for specific involvement now need to be discussed. As an example, dislike of political disorder may incline the military to take steps to reestablish order (attitude), but if they do so, what do they intend exactly to accomplish (motivation)?

#### Motivational Behavior

Nordlinger lists three major areas as motives:

(1) defense or enhancement of the military's corporate interests; (2) lower-class politicization; (3) civilian government performance failures.<sup>128</sup>

#### Corporate Interests

The military's corporate interests are broken into four areas: (1) budgetary support; (2) autonomy; (3) the absence of rivals; (4) the survival of the military.

Budgetary support is a powerful motivating factor for extraprofessional activity. Not only would the military be incapable of accomplishing its major missions without adequate resources, they also affect the material

well-being of the military establishment, insofar as salaries, retirement benefits, housing and other benefits. The size of the budget reflects the relative power and prestige of the military: a large budget (or budget increases) reflects a military which has the support of its government; small or decreased ones are signs that the influence of the military is considered less important. Military self-perceptions as modern, professional institutions are also affected by budget sizes. Having enough funds to purchase modern equipment, conduct military research, or even upgrade military installations means that the military can stay a modern, professional one. Denial of funds for this may not only hurt a country's capability to defend itself, but may also affect the military's perception of its ability to do so (even if the material capability is not truly reduced). It is not coincidence that every civilian government which decreased the budget of the Peruvian Army between 1912 and 1964 was overthrown, in spite of increases in absolute budget sizes. In fact, the 1948 coup was partially explained as being the result of a one-third force reduction (for economic reasons).<sup>129</sup>

Military autonomy has already been discussed under attitudinal behavior as predisposing the military to seek or protect it. Specific threats to autonomy (especially in internal military affairs) create great motives for

intervention, even if they are only relatively minor intrusions. Civilian trespass is seen as a specific threat to professional competence and self-image. If political criteria begin to replace professional ones, the very hierarchical structure is threatened, with a resulting loss in discipline and cohesiveness, as the political officers and professional officers dispute control. The Línea Recta (Straight Line) imbroglio of 1955 shows the sensitivity of the military to its autonomy. At a tea with then-President Carlos Ibáñez of Chile, fifty-eight officers proposed retirement of all officers who would not swear loyalty to the President (as opposed to the Constitution), and, if needed, support for measures by him to restore social order and economic stability (whether unconstitutional or not). When Ibáñez reinstated four officers known to support him (after they had been retired in due course) and retired several others known to be critical of him, the ensuing argument between Ibanistas and non-Ibanistas led to denunciations, forced retirements, and reassignments, and affected not only the military, but Ibáñez's position. Ibáñez tried to control the movement through his supporters in the military, but when the matter became public, withdrew entirely.<sup>130</sup>

The third and fourth areas (the absence of rivals and military survival) center around the existence of a militia-type organization under civilian control. A militia

is almost as dangerous as political interference. It questions the military's ability to defend the Constitution and the nation, and weakens its monopoly on the means of coercion. It is also seen as an organization which can become a political tool for divisiveness; its requirements for support may lead to reductions in the military budget; and it is often seen as an amateur (and, therefore, questionable and dangerous) organization. It may also be a sign that the military, as an institution, is replaceable. The *Milicia Republicana* (Republican Militia) of Chile, from 1932 to 1936, epitomizes the militia problem. Initially a secret organization, its open support of President Alessandri; its open maneuvers by almost 2,000 men in 1932; and the channeling to it of surplus army equipment ignited all the fears outlined above. Not until its disbanding in 1936 did the military feel unthreatened.<sup>131</sup>

#### Lower-Class Politicization

Lower-class politicization is also seen as especially dangerous. It represents the emergence of another set of political interest groups (and contenders for power), and other competitors for public funds in the form of welfare programs (and/or agrarian reform programs, et cetera). Cuba served as an object example of the threat of lower-class power to the military institution: Castro's initial

dismantling of the regular army spoke volumes of the dangers inherent in politicization. Additionally, lower-class politicization poses the same type of threat to middle-class interests, and thus possibly to the military again, insofar as it may or may not represent those interests (this is over and above its own specific military interests). Both Chile and Peru experienced politicized lower classes during this period. The APRA in Peru was especially dangerous in its early years, as it initially did call for the destruction of the military. The massive urban worker support for Allende between 1970-1973 (and the arming of them) was certainly a contributing factor to the 1973 coup. In both cases, not only did the politicization reflect the fears listed above, but it also struck a discordant note in the military's desire for public order.<sup>132</sup>

#### Government Failures

Government performance failures fall into several types: (1) illegal actions; (2) economic declines; (3) the rise of violence and disorder; (4) legitimacy deflations.

Illegal actions and economic declines are almost self-explanatory. As the defenders of the Constitution and nation, the military perceives such matters as illegal acts, arbitrary interpretation of the Constitution or other laws,

laxness in law enforcement in allowing widespread corruption, and failure of economic programs (especially if the government was committed to growth, which then does not occur) as threats to the fabric of the public good.

Disorder and violence not only grate upon the military's attitudinal commitment to order and discipline; they cause problems when (or if) the military is called in to reestablish order, as the situation is then seen as a sign of essential government incompetence.

Legitimacy deflations arise when portions of the populace (of varying sizes or interests) come to believe that they owe no allegiance to the government. Legitimacy deflations, oddly enough, arise from the three areas just mentioned. In fact, large-scale violence and disorder often herald the start of a deflation of legitimacy. To the military, the loss of this legitimacy is more often a facilitator for action than a motivation. The military generally has the power to intervene against any government, legitimate or not. It often may not intervene against a legitimate government simply due to morality, since they probably would then be seen as usurpers (which is definitely out-of-line with their guardian role), and the probability of widespread unrest which would follow. The loss of legitimacy allows the military more freedom to act in their guardian/nation-defender role, with less likelihood of large-scale organized



opposition. The possibility of a fracturing of military cohesiveness is also far greater in a legitimate-government overthrow.<sup>133</sup> (Examples of these will be discussed in the case studies, below.)

Of the three types of motivation, the threat to military corporate interests is the most powerful. Thompson conducted a study of 229 coup attempts in 59 countries from 1946 to 1970. Of those, approximately 23 percent were based on threats to corporate interests.<sup>134</sup>

#### TWO CASE HISTORIES: CHILE AND PERU

We have seen that two sets of factors are involved in the why of military political activity. The first set is attitudinal behavior, which inclines the military to act in a certain way. The second set of factors is motivational. Based on, and reinforced by, attitudinal behavior, motivational factors lead the military to a certain course of action in order to accomplish a certain goal. The two sets thus move from the general to the specific.

The implementation of these factors may lead to completely different types of involvement in politics, as the studies of the cases of Chile and Peru will show. The coups chosen are the 1973 coup in Chile and the 1968 one in Peru. They have been chosen as they represent essentially institutional coups, in which all the Services

participated, with institutional backing, as opposed to a personalist coup, in which one man, backed by a small group, acted (although the two sets of factors might very well apply in either case).

### The Chilean Coup

The failure of any presidential candidate in the election of 1970 led to the Congressional choice of Salvador Allende Gossens as President of Chile. Although Allende was a Marxist, Army Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider publicly supported Allende and his Unidad Popular Party (UP). Schneider, an anti-Marxist by inclination and background, had little objection to a Marxist government--as long as it stayed within constitutional bounds. Although many officers in the military held other views, obedience, discipline, and tradition bound them to support Schneider.<sup>135</sup>

Allende was politically committed to La Vía Chilena (The Chilean Road) to Socialism. The Chilean Road envisioned a complete restructuring of Chile's political institutions, judiciary and educational systems, and economy as the means to achieve the transition. But Allende was a minority coalition President. From the start, he began to experience problems in Congressional approval of his measures. As time passed, the opposition-controlled Congress became more intractable, and even his own coalition

began to experience a split. Committed to radical changes, Allende ran into the gradualism, the commitment to slow, moderate change, which had become a part of Chilean politics. His program also elicited great hostility from the upper, and especially, the middle classes, as they saw their societal position threatened.<sup>136</sup>

Allende began his Presidency by immediately trying to cultivate the good will of the military through such things as pay raises, modernization, et cetera, and continued to do so throughout his term. His assurances of maintaining the constitutionality of the government, and his pledge not to interfere in the internal workings of the military helped maintain that good will. Unfortunately, the assassination of Schneider in October 1970 by a rightist group (Patria y Libertad-Fatherland and Liberty) aided by United States groups, cost him an influential leader in the military establishment. Although General Carlos Prats González, Schneider's successor, continued the Schneider Doctrine (now the Schneider-Prats Doctrine), the death of Schneider allowed the easier growth of two schools of thought in the military. One school, the constitutionalists, believed in supporting the government, as long as it remained within constitutional bounds. The second school, the institutionalists, believed the military should remain apart from the government, and committed solely to the military.<sup>137</sup>

At the same time he began to experience difficulty politically, Allende found his economic program faltering. The radical changes he tried to implement (income redistribution, nationalization, et cetera) had no more than short-term beneficial effects. The deteriorating economic situation was emphasized by The March of the Empty Pots in 1971, when thousands of women from all classes took to the streets to complain of food shortages.<sup>138</sup>

Army institutionalists' fears of Marxism (as a threat to the institution) were fuelled in late 1971 when the MIR (Movimiento Izquierdo Revolucionario--Leftist Revolutionary Movement) began an open, coordinated campaign to persuade Chilean indigenes to seize farms and timber tracts. MIR aircraft hijackings and armed violence also fed military fears over internal order.<sup>139</sup>

In 1972, the picture continued to be gloomy. Allende still walked the narrow line of constitutionality. Plagued by a massive strike begun by truckers resisting a state-owned trucking industry--which became openly political when opposition parties supported it--Allende was forced to declare a partial state of emergency. At the same time, opposition moves to impeach four cabinet ministers forced Allende to a crucial decision: he appointed Flag officers to replace three of them. This active political participation further increased institutionalist fears.

Further concern occurred over the appearance of armed groups other than the MIR. Fed in part by arms shipments from Cuba (the Marxist state in the Western Hemisphere), the increase in parallel armed groups threatened the military monopoly of weapons at the same time it indicated rising disorder and polarization in society.<sup>140</sup>

In addition to the economic problems caused by the truckers strike (the loss to the country was estimated at \$300 million), inflation posed a grave problem, foreign exchange declined (thanks in part to a partial economic blockade by the United States), and the government's ideological stance and nationalization policies dissuaded foreign investment.<sup>141</sup>

By the end of 1972, many military officers felt that Allende was using the military to sanctify his government. They saw the active participation of officers in the cabinet (and others in nationalized industries) as compromising the professional character of the Armed Forces. Constitutionalist had begun to see Prats' continued political involvement with dismay (especially when he began to defend the Allende regime) and felt they were losing their greatest supporter.<sup>142</sup>

The year 1973 began badly for the government: in the March parliamentary elections, it failed to achieve a majority, confirming the impasse between the President

and Congress. In fact, the UP received a lower percentage of the vote than it had in either 1969 or 1971, a clear signal of loss of voter approval. In May, Allende directly challenged Congress and exacerbated constitutionalist concerns when he declared that only he should call plebiscites in the future, and that it would require a two-thirds vote by Congress to override his veto of some Congressional nationalization plans opposed by him.<sup>143</sup>

Civilian arming and violence continued to rise. Shoot-outs between Communist and ultra-Right groups continued; a military patrol exchanged gunfire with the Communist Party Ramona Parra Brigade at Los Cerrillos airport on 19 June, and striking miners at El Teniente copper mines were only subdued after a battle with police. Armed worker groups sprang up in the industrial areas of major cities, while other groups seized factories (at Allende's direction) after a failed coup attempt by Colonel Roberto Souper on 29 June. Rigorous efforts by the military to disband or disarm the groups were not completely successful, and armed militia groups appeared in Santiago suburbs as police forces lost the ability to enforce law and order.

The economic situation continued to worsen: galloping inflation (estimated at 323 percent from July 1972 to July 1973), strikes, and general deterioration of the

economy raised opposition to the government throughout society.<sup>144</sup>

The division between institutionalists and constitutionalists came to a head when societal groups began urging the Armed Forces to intervene. The Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution in mid-August denouncing Allende for Constitutional violations, and called on the military to prevent future ones.<sup>145</sup> On 7 September, a group of employer organizations asked the military to "adopt a clear, immediate, and definitive attitude in defense of the interests of our fatherland and national security."<sup>146</sup>

The final blow, perhaps, was the combination of the obvious complicity of Socialists and Communists in a plot to foment a mutiny in the Navy, and the discovery of Plan Zeta, which was reported to be a plan for the creation of a revolutionary army and the execution of leading opposition and military figures.<sup>147</sup>

Faced with political strife, widespread violence and disorder; threats to its own survival; called upon by society to intervene; the institutionalists won out over the constitutionalists, and a military junta seized control of the government on 11 September 1973.

An analysis of the Chilean coup based on Nordlinger's categories of behavior is shown in Figure 7.



FIGURE 7

## Nordlinger's behavioral factors and the 1973 Chilean coup.

Motivational Behavior	Reinforced, positively or negatively, by situation/ events?	Reinforced by attitudinal behavior factors?
<p>Military corporate interests:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) budgetary support</li> <li>2) autonomy</li> <li>3) absence of rivals</li> <li>4) military survival</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Initial improvements (1971) positive; overall decline, probably negative.</li> <li>2) Negative by using officers in government/business.</li> <li>3) and 4) Negative; mass arming of various groups; Allende's ordering urban industrial groups to arm; appearance of small militia groups (1973).</li> </ol>	<p>Yes: threats to autonomy, exclusiveness, cohesiveness; hierarchical structure; rationality principle.</p>
<p>Lower-class politicization.</p>	<p>Negative: strikes; arming by working-class groups; seizure of land in <u>sierra</u>.</p>	<p>Yes: attitudes toward political activity, political order, and exclusiveness.</p>
<p>Governmental failures:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) illegal actions</li> <li>2) economic decline</li> <li>3) rise of violence and disorder</li> <li>4) legitimacy deflations.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Negative: Allende's constitutional gamesmanship.</li> <li>2) Negative: inflation; falling foreign trade/exchange; monetary loss caused by strikes.</li> <li>3) Negative: actions of MIR and other groups; strikes.</li> <li>4) Negative: opposition in Congress; strikes; rising violence and disorder.</li> </ol>	<p>Yes: attitude toward political order, political activity, and governmental process.</p>

As seen in Figure 7, events leading to the 1973 coup negatively reinforced almost every military attitudinal or motivational behavior factor. The surprise of the coup lies not in it having occurred, but in it having taken so long to do so.

#### The Peruvian Coup

The roots of the 1968 coup lie as much in the political history of the country as they do in the events immediately preceding the coup. The military's long-standing hatred of the APRA set it against the party, institutionally, until well into the 1970s. In fact, a major reason for the 1962 coup was military fear of APRA control of the government.<sup>148</sup>

The 1962 coup was also important to the military as an institution. The junta concept of one officer as President depending on the support and approval of all three Service Ministers (Army, Navy, Air Force) for his actions showed the military had found a way to fuse its military and political roles.<sup>149</sup>

When Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected President in 1963, it initially seemed as if his programs were in general agreement with the CAEM-directed military ideology. Belaunde envisioned a country in which the Two

Perus--the coast and the sierra--would each contribute to national development.

He envisioned a genuinely pluralistic country in which the coast could advance with its westernized, capitalist traditions while the sierra progressed through its at least semisocialistic Inca customs. . . . Belaúnde seemed to feel that with its natural potential for growth, the coastal population was already nearly sufficient to provide for the immediate needs of industrial growth. His great desire was to have the Indians migrate towards the East and colonize the fertile eastern slopes of the Andes, thereby bringing new land under cultivation . . . [thus hoping] to solve the problem of the country's chronic food shortage. . . .<sup>150</sup>

Belaúnde also proposed supporting this idea, and at the same time, opening up the Eastern Slope, by building a highway in the eastern foothills.<sup>151</sup>

Belaúnde had promised a revolution without bullets throughout his campaign. While the coastal-sierra conjunction reflected part of this, other programs developed the idea further. He began civic action programs in both urban and rural areas, using the military in several of them. He committed himself to dramatic improvements in the literacy rate, expanding educational opportunities at all levels. He also directed the implementation of public housing programs, and developed a system of health clinics in the provinces. He also attempted implementation of an ambitious agrarian reform program. Enthusiasm for many of these

programs was high; the military approved, as they seemed only continuations of ideas the 1962 junta had generated.<sup>152</sup>

Unfortunately, these programs almost immediately encountered problems. First, they were enormously expensive (public spending jumped from 14 billion soles to 30 billion during his term). This increased spending in the public sector; similar increases in the private sector; and Belaúnde's fiscal policies in general, places the sol under heavy pressure. Inflation mounted, government expenses continued to exceed incomes, and Peru's trade balance suffered. In 1967, the government was forced to devalue the sole by 35 percent.

In addition, Belaúnde had begun his term with a coalition platform, and without a majority in Congress. His coalition ran into immediate opposition over the agrarian reform bill. As public expenditures mounted and the economy began to decline, opposition to the government became more pronounced and aggressive, while the differences in Belaúnde's coalition became a schism.<sup>153</sup>

Internal security was threatened by the guerilla activity already mentioned, and led the Minister of War to conclude that a "latent insurgency"<sup>154</sup> existed. This occupied military thought during the remainder of Belaúnde's tenure, and contributed to the military's thinking the

government was unable to control the populace the way it should.<sup>155</sup>

Normal military distrust of politicians was heightened by APRA's shifting sands. APRA began as a radical (but not Communist) party. With the growth of Belaúnde's Acción Popular in the 1950s and 1960s, its domination of populism was greatly weakened. That, and continual harsh opposition by the military led it to begin to change its views, in order to participate in politics at all. It began to drift to the Right, until it found itself temporarily allied with the ultra-Conservative Union Nacional Odriista (UNO) and the oligarchy during Belaunde's term. This caused severe dissension within the party: many party members began to deplore the opportunism of their leaders. Additionally, APRA had been the birth place of many Communist movements (such as Peru's MIR). Toward the end of Belaúnde's term, the APRA and UNO split, and APRA began to redefine its position again. This only confirmed military ideas about politics, compromise, opportunism, et cetera. Their view was not helped by the fact that Belaúnde was going through nineteen cabinets in order to survive.<sup>156</sup>

Belaúnde's relationship with the military had begun well, as it identified with many of his programs. Although the military share of the budget had decreased

slightly in terms of percentage, its dollar amount had not decreased significantly.<sup>157</sup> One problem was that Belaúnde did not seem to realize the importance of the military's developed ideology. He did not seem to understand the military commitment to independence from external influence. (In fact, he initially looked upon the coup as a Rightist, oligarchic-military action).<sup>158</sup> This misunderstanding was to have a fatal effect on his government during the International Petroleum Company (IPC) dispute.

In brief, the dispute between IPC and the government revolved around who actually owned the subsurface mineral rights of the IPC-run La Brea oil fields. IPC believed it did. The government, however, maintained that under Peruvian law, subsurface minerals could not be privately owned. Therefore, IPC owed back taxes on the oil already taken from the fields, and any new oil taken from them was to be disposed of as national property according to governmental wishes. The argument had been going on since the early 1930s. During his inaugural address, Belaúnde promised to settle the dispute within ninety days, but the argument lasted until 13 August 1968, when Belaúnde announced it had been settled. The clauses of the agreement were harshly attacked by groups throughout the nation as being unacceptable and disadvantageous to Peru: controversy was so strong that Edgardo Seoane (the Number Two man

in AP) denounced his own party leader, and AP split into two factions. The cabinet resigned on 2 October in an act of nonsupport, and faced with this latest sign of political incompetence and lack of national pride, the military staged a coup early on 3 October 1968.<sup>159</sup>

Nordlinger's behavioral factors as applied to the Peruvian coup are shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8 immediately shows that the major motivational factors affecting military reaction to Belaúnde's government were governmental failures. Having had a reasonable success with the junta system in 1962-1963, the military--with its new ideology of national development--could not accept the civilian government's failure in the revolution without bullets. In large part conditioned by the CAEM, the experiences in the guerilla campaigns of 1965-1966 (when the nature of latent insurgency based on social, political, and economic faults was first seen), and by political incompetence, the military struck in order to achieve the revolution without bullets.

Although motivated by some similar factors (such as economic decline and legitimacy deflations), the Peruvian military acted to make a revolution; the Chilean military acted to make a counterrevolution.



FIGURE 8

## Nordlinger's behavioral factors and the 1968 Peruvian coup.

Motivational Behavior	Reinforced, positively or negatively, by situation/ events?	Reinforced by attitudinal behavior factors?
<hr/>		
Military corporate interests:	1) Negative: decrease in share of budget. 2) No significant effect. 3) No significant effect. 4) Probably negative; guerilla campaigns with example of Cuba.	
<hr/>		
Lower-class politicization.	1) Negative: initial guerilla activity in sierra. 2) Positive: ideology supports more equitable power/income distribution (but not at cost of class warfare).	1) Yes: attitudes toward political activity and order.
<hr/>		
Governmental failures:	1) No significant effect. 2) Negative: inflation, devaluation of sol; balance of trade declines. 3) Negative: guerilla activity in sierra with perceived latent insurgency. 4) Negative: IPC imbroglío; AP split; strong political opposition in Congress.	Yes: attitudes political order, political activity.
<hr/>		
1) illegal actions		
2) economic decline		
3) rise of violence and disorder		
4) legitimacy deflations		

## CONCLUSION

From 1886 to 1973, the military in Chile underwent a period of professionalization; Peru did the same from 1896 to 1968. Both military establishments began by contracting individual officers from European armies to help develop their forces into modern military institutions. By the beginning of World War II, both Chile and Peru had established a strong institutional framework for their armed forces: education, promotion, and rotation of assignments were more or less standardized. Between World War II and the 1968 (Peru) and 1973 (Chile) coups, this framework was strengthened so that new officers could see where their choice of career could take them. Throughout the entire period, the sense of profession was strengthened, as the military developed more sense of group identity, increased skill, and the internal administration to serve its needs.

The initial personal-type missions of France and Germany helped form internal attitudes to politics and society which were so well-established that the apolitical attitudes of the United States military missions had little effect. Although neither the Chilean nor the Peruvian military remained politicized during the entire period, the political attitudes of their French and German mentors took effective root. This was especially true in Chile

between 1920-1932, and in Peru between 1950-1968. The Chilean case was dependent almost entirely upon European thought as modified internally within the military. The Peruvian case took attitudes which were already internalized, added their view of United States strategic concepts and arrived at its idea of national development.

The cases are markedly similar in the interpretation of the military's importance to the nation, but Peru--through the CAEM--institutionalized its concept to the point that it was able to effect an institutional coup from its ideology. Chile's lack of a comparable development left its military at a greater disadvantage between 1924-1932, and again in 1973, although the internal strengthening of the military itself, along with the threat of a revolution and civil war, helped it to present a more united front in 1973.

The professionalization of the military in both countries led to the development of behavioral factors which predisposed the organizations to act in certain ways, or to achieve certain goals. These factors' interactions with societal events, situations, or attitudes gave rise to the strong institutionalization of the new professionalism in the Peruvian military, and were of overwhelming importance in the decision to intervene in 1968. The Chilean decision was based less on the ideology of national

development (as it had no CAEM to reinforce the idea), but faced a much graver immediate threat--one which undoubtedly helped to coalesce attitudes.

There are several questions which remain to be answered, and for which only primary research (for the most part) can provide an answer.

First, more research could provide more knowledge of what the French and German governments saw, specifically, could be gained from their missions.

Second, a thorough comparison of articles, in-house journals, and other writings might give a better perspective into the why of the contrast between Chilean and Peruvian military ideology of the 1920s.

Third, a comparison of internal organizations (i.e., tactical unit organization, administrative organization of the army, et cetera) during the European and United States periods, with the organizations of the military of France, Germany, and the United States, might give further insight into the exact depth of penetration of foreign influence during those periods, along with an insight on how internal Peruvian and Chilean views modified those organizations for local conditions. (For example, United States army equipment is made to operate throughout greater temperature ranges than the equipment of many other

armies, due to its world-wide mission, and need to withstand climatic extremes.)<sup>160</sup>

Another point which could stand clarification is the Chilean coup. The 1973 coup was the first instance of an institutional coup in Chile. Without a CAEM-type institution, primary-source research might reveal in clearer detail what forces were involved in instituting that type of coup, rather than a more personalistic one. Although the sheer institutional development of the military provides part of the answer, further primary-source research might reveal the effect of the Brazilian, Argentinian, and Peruvian examples (if any). That research would also surely reveal a better understanding of the inner workings of the Chilean military during 1970-1973.

Unfortunately, until that type of information is available, a complete understanding of the professionalization--institutionally, ideologically, or otherwise--is difficult to present.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Frederick E. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810-1973 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 73.

<sup>2</sup>Jorge Basadre, Historia de la república del Perú, 10 vols. (Lima: Ediciones "Historia," 1963), 7:3152. It should be noted that the Navies and Air Forces of these countries have always been overshadowed by the Army, which has continued to be the most important branch of Service; military and army will thus be used interchangeably throughout this report. As the officer corps has been the dominant force in the military, professionalization will be discussed as it affected the officer corps, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>3</sup>Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup>Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 31.

<sup>5</sup>Samuel F. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), pp. 54-55. It should be noted, however, that not even the United States Army, which is recognized as one of the most professional in the world, fully satisfies all of Huntington's conditions, as the overwhelming majority of its officers, like the author, are products of the Reserve Officer Training system (ROTC), and not of the U.S. Military Academy.

<sup>6</sup>Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-25; Douglas A. Chalmers, "The Politicized state in Latin America," in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, edited by James M. Malloy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 27; Frederick B. Pike, The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 18-19.

<sup>8</sup>Pike, Andean Republics, p. 18.

<sup>9</sup>Nunn, The Military, pp. 8-9.

<sup>10</sup>Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1967), p. 13.

<sup>11</sup>David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History (Carbon-dale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), pp. 11-21.

<sup>12</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 68.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 68-69.

<sup>14</sup>Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 77-109.

<sup>15</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 73.

<sup>16</sup>Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 32.

<sup>17</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 85.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Dupuy, A Genius, p. 117; Nunn, The Military, p. 85.

<sup>20</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 85.

<sup>21</sup>Burr, By Reason, pp. 8-10; Albrecht von Gleich, Germany and Latin America (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1968), pp. 3-4.

<sup>22</sup>Frederick M. Nunn, "Militares Chilenos: desarrollo institucional; relaciones civico-militares; consideraciones de politica," translated by Gisela von Muehlenbrock M., Cuadernos del Instituto de Ciencia Política (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1977), p. 185.

<sup>23</sup>Nunn, The Military, pp. 72-76, 113-114; Roy A. Hansen, "Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Military," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1967), p. 185.

<sup>24</sup>Nunn, The Military, pp. 76-76, 112; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 32.

<sup>25</sup>Nunn, The Military, pp. 111-112; Frederick M. Nunn, "The Latin American Military Establishment: Some Thoughts on the Origin of Its Sociopolitical Role and an Illustrative Bibliography," The Americas 38 (October 1971): 140.

<sup>26</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 112.



<sup>27</sup>Frederick M. Nunn, "Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Origins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, 1890-1940," Military Affairs 39 (no date): 1.

<sup>28</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 104.

<sup>29</sup>Nunn, "Effects," p. 2; John J. Johnson, "The Latin American Military as a Competing Group in Transitional Society," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 101-123; Brian Loveman, Chile, The Legacy of Spanish Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 243. The strength of the officer corps was 800 in 1900; 1,200 in 1928; according to Nunn (The Military, pp. 112, 171), thus the figure given.

<sup>30</sup>Frederick M. Nunn, "El profesionalismo militar Chileno en el siglo XX: pensamiento y autopercepcion de la clase de oficiales hasta 1973," translated by Gisela von Muehlenbrock M., Cuadernos de Instituto de Ciencia Política (Santiago: Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1976), p. 3; Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 218-228.

<sup>31</sup>Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, translated by Philip A. Ashworth (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1913), pp. 8-25, 50-54.

<sup>32</sup>Hubert Maurice Gonzalvez Lyautey, "Du Role Social de L'Officier," cited in Nunn, "El profesionalismo," p. 7.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Nunn, "The Latin American Military," p. 140.

<sup>35</sup>Nunn, "Profesionalismo," pp. 5-6, 8-9; Nunn, The Military, pp. 119-120.

<sup>36</sup>Nunn, "Profesionalismo," p. 14; Charles de Gaulle, The Edge of the Sword, translated by Gerald Hopkins (New York: Criterion Books, 1960), pp. 56-59, 103-106.

<sup>37</sup>Dupuy, A Genius, pp. 197-221.

<sup>37</sup>Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 86-88.

- <sup>39</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 117.
- <sup>40</sup>Pike, Chile, pp. 86-89, 107-114; Nunn, The Military, pp. 116-119.
- <sup>41</sup>Pike, Chile, pp. 174-186; Nunn, The Military, pp. 115-116, 121-124, 131-134, 156.
- <sup>42</sup>Nunn, The Military, pp. 164-168.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 168-169; Nunn, "Effects," p. 3.
- <sup>44</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 170.
- <sup>45</sup>Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean Politics, 1920-31: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970), pp. 160-168; Nunn, The Military, pp. 195-217.
- <sup>46</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 186.
- <sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 262.
- <sup>48</sup>Ibid., pp. 186, 192-194, 261-263.
- <sup>49</sup>Carlos Dellapiane, Historia militar del Perú, 2 vols. (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1931), 2:511.
- <sup>50</sup>Victor Villanueva, Cien años del ejército peruano: Frustraciones y cambios (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1971), p. 34.
- <sup>51</sup>Frederick B. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 173-174; Nunn, "Effects," p. 4; Basadre, Historia, 7:3152.
- <sup>52</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 173-174; Pike, Andean Republics, pp. 118-121.
- <sup>53</sup>Basadre, Historia, 7:3152, 3397; Pike, Modern History, p. 174; Juan Mendoza R., "El ejército," in Visión del Perú en el siglo XX, edited by José Pereja Paz-Soldán, 2 vols. (Lima: Ediciones Librería Studium, 1962), 1:299-312.
- <sup>54</sup>Basadre, Historia, 7:3155-3317; Frederick M. Nunn, "Notes on the Junta Phenomenon and the 'Military Regime' in Latin America, with Special Reference to Peru 1968-1972," The Americas 31 (January 1975): 246.

<sup>55</sup>Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 173-324, 330; Villanueva, Cién años, pp. 91-114; Pike, Modern History, 226-269, 278-279.

<sup>56</sup>Villanueva, Cién años, pp. 119, 62.

<sup>57</sup>Mendoza R., "El ejército," p. 312.

<sup>58</sup>Raymond Estep, "The Role of the Military in Peruvian Politics," Air University Documentary Research Study (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1970), p. 46.

<sup>59</sup>Mendoza R., "El ejército," pp. 312-313.

<sup>60</sup>Villanueva, Cién años, p. 63.

<sup>61</sup>Nunn, "Effects," p. 1.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5; Basadre, Historia, 7:3318, 8:3631.

<sup>63</sup>Nunn, "Effects," p. 5; Nunn, "Profesionalismo," pp. 6-7.

<sup>64</sup>Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Morla, cited in Nunn, "Effects," p. 5. The early development of ideological thought has been difficult to trace: neither primary nor secondary source material on the subject was available to the author in great extent. It is an area for further research.

<sup>65</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 193.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 320.

<sup>67</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 201-202, 246-247.

<sup>68</sup>Nunn, The Military, p. 193; Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1971) pp. 32, 36-37, 58-59.

<sup>69</sup>J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 186-199; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, pp. 188-189.

<sup>70</sup>Mecham, The United States, pp. 424-427; Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, pp. 191-192; James A. Sandos, "U.S. Military Policy Toward Latin America," World Affairs 135 (Spring 1973): 294.

<sup>71</sup>Luigi R. Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations with the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1970), p. 58; Nunn, The Military, pp. 72-73; Instruction received by the author in the United States Army Foreign Area Officer Course, United States Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, July-December 1981.

<sup>72</sup>Mecham, The United States, pp. 200-201, 226.

<sup>73</sup>United States Army Foreign Area Officer Course, 1981.

<sup>74</sup>Irving L. Horowitz, "The Military Elites," in Elites in Latin America, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 177-178.

<sup>75</sup>Juergen Schaefer, Deutsche Militaerhilfe an Suedamerika (Duesseldorf: Verlagsgruppe Bertelsmann, 1974), pp. 28-46.

<sup>76</sup>Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, pp. 197-198; Sandos, "U.S. Military Policy," pp. 293-294.

<sup>77</sup>United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government, 92d Congress, 1st Session, 1971, pp. 310-311, 313, 315.

<sup>78</sup>Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, p. 58; Alain Joxe, Las Fuerzas Armadas en el sistema politico de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), p. 101. Officers from various Latin American nations were in the author's U.S. Special Forces Officers Course (1974) and Infantry Officers Advanced Course (1977-1978). The author was the sponsor of a Peruvian Army Major during the latter course.

<sup>79</sup>Philippe E. Schmitter, "Introduction," to Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives, edited by Phillippe E. Schmitter (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, Incorporated, 1973), p. x.

<sup>80</sup>Nunn, "The Latin American Military," p. 136.

<sup>81</sup>James R. Schlesinger, cited in Horowitz, "The Military Elites," p. 175.

<sup>82</sup>United States Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1964, p. 759.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup>United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92d Congress, 1st Session, 1971, pp. 437-438.

<sup>86</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 1171.

<sup>87</sup>Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, pp. 36-37; Sandos, "U.S. Military Policy," p. 300.

<sup>88</sup>Lieuwen, Arms and Politics, p. 224 (emphasis added).

<sup>89</sup>John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 143-144, 196.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 196.

<sup>91</sup>Hansen, "Military Culture," pp. 168-181.

<sup>92</sup>The author's first exposure to equipment cost was as a battalion property book officer in 1972: M-60 medium tanks at that time were listed at over \$300,000, while individual small arms listed at over \$100 each. At present (1982), an XM-1 main battle tank costs over \$2 million dollars.

<sup>93</sup>Hansen, "Military Culture," p. 201; Joseph E. Loftus, Latin American Military Expenditures, 1938-1965, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1968), p. 36.

<sup>94</sup>Hansen, "Military Culture," pp. 198-200.

<sup>95</sup>Frederick M. Nunn, "Old Myths and New Standards in Latin American Civil-Military Relations: Towards an Explanation of the Chilean 'Golpe de Estado' of 1973 and Its Ramifications," paper presented to the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin America Studies, Texas Technical University, 1974, pp. 29-31. It is interesting to note that Peru's ministers were military officers, and that Peru's military was far more actively involved in politics, although further research is necessary to see if a relationship truly exists. . . .

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 15-20.

<sup>97</sup>Child, Unequal Alliance, pp. 143-145, 178-179; Nunn, "Old Myths," pp. 3, 9; Nunn, "Militares," p. 8; Victor Villanueva, Modelo contrarevolucionario Chileno, (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1976), pp. 66-67.

<sup>98</sup>Einaudi, Peruvian Military Relations, pp. 4-6, 9, 11.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

<sup>102</sup>Mendoza R., "El ejército," p. 293.

<sup>103</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, p. 32; Victor Villanueva, El CAEM y la revolucion de la Fuerza Armada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972), p. 23. Villanueva has interesting thoughts and figures which diminish the idea that CAEM graduates were heavily influenced by radical Left instructors.

<sup>104</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, pp. 12, 17; Villanueva, El CAEM, pp. 25-28, 38. The similarity between the CAEM and the U.S. National War College (created 1947) would be a worthwhile subject for a monograph, as none exists at present.

<sup>105</sup>Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 58.

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 55-59, 218-219.

<sup>107</sup>Child, Unequal Alliance, pp. 192-193, 196-199.

<sup>108</sup> Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Retrospective (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 119; Alain Rocquie, "Military Revolution and National Independence in Latin America: 1968-1971," in Schmitter, Military Rule, pp. 20-21; Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, pp. 12, 36-37; Julio Cotler, "The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru," in Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution, edited by David Chaplin (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 42.

<sup>109</sup> Pike, Modern History, pp. 264-268, 275, 284, 300. The exchange of massacres at Trujillo in 1932 had an inestimable effect upon the courses of both APRA and the military. It should be noted that the Right was also involved in attempts to influence the military. Both types of political meddling were resented.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., pp. 275, 280, 288; Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, p. 27.

<sup>111</sup> Stepan, State and Society, pp. 131-136.

<sup>112</sup> The CAEM, "El estado y la politica general," cited in Stepan, State and Society, p. 254.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>114</sup> Villanueva, El CAEM, p. 109.

<sup>115</sup> Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, p. 35.

<sup>116</sup> See especially Mauricio Solaún and Michael A. Quinn, Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1973), and Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Incorporated, 1977).

<sup>117</sup> Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 31.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., pp. 32-42; Edwin Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America," in Johnson, Role of the Military, p. 135; Francis Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1970), p. 314; Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, pp. 41-47; Hansen, "Military Culture," pp. 177; Nunn, Old Myths, p. 3.



<sup>119</sup>Hansen, "Military Culture," pp. 201-206; 214-217.

<sup>120</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 37-47; Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, p. 12, 17-18; Villanueva, Cien años, p. 62; Nunn, "Militares," p. 6; Nunn, "Profesionalismo," p. 18.

<sup>121</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 47-49.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., pp. 53-56; Solaun and Quinn, Sinners, pp. 21-27.

<sup>123</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 56.

<sup>124</sup>Lyle M. McAlister, The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), p. 152.

<sup>125</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 56-60.

<sup>126</sup>Nunn, "Militares," p. 6.

<sup>127</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 60-61.

<sup>128</sup>Ibid., pp. 65, 79, 85. Nordlinger has been drawn on heavily for the reason that he not only accurately and thoroughly synthesizes the works of other major authors in the area (i.e., Huntington, Needler, Lieuwen, Janowitz, et al.), but also because it is the best, and most recent, detailed treatment of the subject available to the author.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., pp. 65-67.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., p. 71; Nunn, The Military, pp. 245-246.

<sup>131</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, p. 75; Nunn, The Military, pp. 228-229; Loveman, Chile, p. 264.

<sup>132</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 79-85; Pike, Modern History, pp. 238-243, 245-246.

<sup>133</sup>Nordlinger, Soldiers, pp. 85-95.

<sup>134</sup>William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 12-26.

<sup>135</sup>Thomas G. Sanders, "Military Government in Chile, Part I: The Coup," Fieldstaff Reports, West Coast South America Series 22 (December 1975): 3; Nunn, The Military, pp. 266-267.

<sup>136</sup>Loveman, Chile, pp. 333-334; Villanueva, Modelo, pp. 59, 70-73, 76-78; Nunn, The Military, pp. 257-258.

<sup>137</sup>Bynum E. Weathers, "The Role of the Military in Chilean Politics, 1810-1980," Air University Documentary Research Study (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: United States Air Force, 1980), pp. 149-157; Nunn, The Military, pp. 272-273.

<sup>138</sup>Loveman, Chile, pp. 335-336, 340-341; Villanueva, Modelo, p. 105.

<sup>139</sup>Weathers, "Role," pp. 160-161; Nunn, The Military, p. 275.

<sup>140</sup>Loveman, Chile, pp. 341-341; Weathers, "Role," pp. 157-161; Villanueva, Modelo, pp. 122-123.

<sup>141</sup>Weathers, "Role," p. 161; Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 284-285.

<sup>142</sup>Sanders, "The Coup," p. 4; Nunn, The Military, pp. 279-284.

<sup>143</sup>Loveman, Chile, p. 343; Nunn, The Military, pp. 279-284.

<sup>144</sup>Loveman, Chile, p. 344; Villanueva, Modelo, pp. 107, 109-112; Weathers, "Role," pp. 165-168; Sigmund, Overthrow, pp. 215, 218, 234.

<sup>145</sup>Sigmund, Overthrow, pp. 232-233.

<sup>146</sup>Latin America, Vol 7. No. 36, 7 September 1973, p. 283.

<sup>147</sup>Weathers, "Role," p. 177. It should be noted that the complete authenticity of Plan Zeta has always been in doubt.

<sup>148</sup>Pike, Modern History, p. 300; Werlich, Peru, pp. 272-273.

<sup>149</sup>George D. E. Phillip, The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals 1968-1976 (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), p. 44.

<sup>150</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 307-308.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., p. 308; Werlich, Peru, pp. 282-283.

<sup>152</sup>Pike, Modern History, pp. 310-316; Werlich, Peru, pp. 280-284.

<sup>153</sup>Werlich, Peru, pp. 284-288; Philip, Rise and Fall, pp. 37-47; Vivian Trias, Peru: Fuerzas Armadas y revolucion (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1971), pp. 70-71.

<sup>154</sup>Einaudi and Stepan, Institutional Development, p. 27.

<sup>155</sup>Ibid., pp. 27-28.

<sup>156</sup>Werlich, Peru, pp. 280, 284, 289; Philip, Rise and Fall, pp. 31-32, 40, 46-47; Trias, Peru, p. 70.

<sup>157</sup>Loftus, Defense Expenditures, Table 1, p. 11; Table 5, p. 36.

<sup>158</sup>Werlich, Peru, pp. 297-298.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., pp. 289-296; Trias, Peru, p. 70, 91-96.

<sup>160</sup>Author's personal experience.

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Douglas Vincent Kottal was born in Champaign, Illinois, on 7 July 1949, the son of Elene Bennett Kottal and John Lenord Kottal. After completing his work at William C. Hinkley High School, Aurora, Colorado, in 1966, he entered Colorado State University at Fort Collins, Colorado, where he received the Bachelor of Arts degree in Art in 1970. He was commissioned as a Regular Army officer in the United States Army on 11 December 1970. During the next eleven years, he served in various command and staff positions with units in the United States, the Republic of South Korea, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Major Kottal entered the University of Texas at Austin in 1982.

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